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To improve growth prospects in Zimbabwe, foreign trade must
be reformed and the country's high public deficits - which
crowd  out  private  consumption  and  private  investment  - must
be reduced.
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This paper -a  product  of the Macroeconomic  Adjustment  and Growth  Division,  Country Economics
Departnent - is pa"rt  of a PRE series of case studies  on the macroeconomics  of public sector  deficits.
Copies  are available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433. Please  contact
Susheela  Jonnakuty,  room NI 1-039,  extension  39074  (109 pages  with figures and tables,  plus 9 pages  of
appendix).
Zimbabwe  has the uncommon  combination  of a  The fi§cal  adjustment  begun in 1987  helped
high public deficit,  a balanc' _'current  account,  stabilize  the public  debt and improved  recovery
low inflation,  and low levels of investment  and  of investment. But more fiscal adjustment  is
growth.  needed  to improve  macroeconomic  and financial
stability  and growth  prospects.
Despite  a surplus  in the current  account,  the
nofinancial public  sector  has run deficits  Public  deficits  must be reduced  to ensure  a
exceeding  10 percent  of GDP  since 1981.  sustainable  path for public  debt. High deficits
flation  is low but interest  rates are rising  are crowding  out both private  consumption  and
because  of partial  financial liberalization  and  private investment,  The public sector  must be
rising  domestic  public debt  stocks.  adjusted  and foreign  trade must be reformed  to  fb
improve  capital formation-  a prerequisite  for
Heavy  public spending  crowded  out private  improving  growti prospects  in Zimbabwe.
consumption  and investment  in the 1980s. The
private saving  rate is a staggering  20 percent  of
GDP,  which finances  all of Zimbabwe's  invest-
ment.
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The Zimbabwean  economy  presents a rather infrequent  combination  of stabilizcd  cxtcrnul
accounts  with heavy  public  imbalances  financed  by the domestic  private  sector. While  the currcnt
account  is in surplus,  the non-financial  public  sector has run deficits  exceeding  10%  of GDP since
1981/82.  (see table 1.1). Inflation  is low  while  domestic  interest rates are increasing  signiricantly,
reflecting  partial financial  liberalization  and, possibly,  rising  domestic  public debt stocks.  Total
(foreign  and domestic)  debt of the non-financial  public  sector rose  steadily  from  55.4%  in June 1980
to 82.8%  of GDP in June 1987. A partial,  although  import.... fiscal  adjustment  took place  in 1987/88
and  thereafter, implying  a decline  in NFPS  deficit  from 14.4%  of GDP in 1986/87  to 10%  in 1988189,
contributing  to the stabilization  of public  liabilities  to GDP ratios during  the last two years.'
High  public  sector  spending  has crowded  out both private  consumption  and investment  during
the eighties. Crowding  out of private spending  has been supported by restrictions  imposed  on
consumer  and capital imports,  and in the case of private investment,  by lingering  uncertainty  with
regard to possible  policy  changes  which  could  affect future property  rights,  taxes and relative  prices.
Hence  the private  sector  is  saving  a staggering  portion  of GDP:  since  1984/85  it saves  more  than  20%
of GDP, financing  more than 100%o  of Zimbabwe's  gross  investment.
The fiscal  adjustment  started  in 1987/88  is a significant  step in the right  direction.  It contributed
not only to a more stable public  debt path but also to a partial recovery  of private and aggregate
gross investment This study suggests,  however, that additional fiscal adjustment is required to
enhance both macroeconomic  and financial  stability  and growth  prospects  in Zimbabwe.
'Among  recent papers on Zimbabwe's  macroeconomic  situation  and prospects  are Chibber  ct
al. (1989),  Dailami  and Walton (1989),  Davies  and Rattso (1990),  Khadr  et al. (1989),  and McKay
(1989).-6-
TABLE  1.1
ZIMBABWE  MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
A.  Aggregate Indicators
GOP  growth  tX)  10.6  "2.5  2.6  1.6  *1.9  6.8  2.6  -1.5  6.5  4.9
Capacity  UtiLization  79.7  89.3  88.0  85.4  80.5  64.3  85.8  83.8  88.8
Inftlation  10.3  14.5  14.2  19.4  3.5  2.6  15.2  9.2  11.9  12.9
Real Wage  C1980a100)  100.0  103.7  114.5  110.2  111.5  120.7  112.3  110.1  110.1  107.2
Real  Exchange  Rate  C1980s100)  100.0  115.1  132.0  134.2  123.3  188.7  119.?  108.2  92.5  85.6
NominaL  mnt. Rate on Public  Debt  4.4  S.9  7.8  7.7  8.0  10.4  12.5  13.0  13.3  13.0
NominaL  Int.  Rate on Deposits  (t)  3.5  7.8  8.0  8.0  8.0  8.1  8.0  8.2  8.3  8.3
B.  Compositfon of  Output  (% of  GOP)
Private  Consumption  64.5  67.0  65.0  66.1  62.4  63.2  6C.1  52.7  51.7  50.9
PubLic Consumption  19.7  17.2  19.8  18.4  21.3  22.2  21.8  24.1  23.0  23.0
Private  Fixed  Investment  10.6  13.3  10.0  8.2  10.6  7.9  8.4  7.8  9.0  9.4
Pubtic  Fixed  Investment  4.7  5.3  9.9  11.4  7.9  8.2  7.2  7.7  8.9  9.2
Change  In  Stocks  3.5  4.4  1.2  *3.7  0.4  4.9  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6
Exports  30.3  25.2  22.0  21.3  26.7  29.9  30.9  31.2  31.2  33.7
Imports  33.3  32.5  27.9  24.5  26.1  28.7  26.5  27.1  27.5  29.8
C.  Consolidated  NFPS  Deficit  and  Debt
1.  Fiscal  Year Data  tX  of  GOP)
NFPS  Deficit  9.1  13.5  13.1  14.4  12.7  14.3  14.4  10.9  10.4
NFPS  Foreign  Debt  12.0  1?.6  23.3  27.0  33.3  42.2  40.6  41.1  38.0
NFPS  Domestic Debt  43.4  37.2  33.7  31.3  35.7  35.5  36.6  41.7  42.9
2.  Calendar Year Data  (% of  GOP)
NFPS  Deficit  8.8  9.?
NFPS  Foreign  Debt  36.9  37.8
NFPS  Oomestic Debt  47.4  46.9
0.  monetary System C%  of  GOP)
Base Money  6.9  7.1  7.3  6.2  6.7  7.5  7.2  7.0  7.7  7.7
11  18.4  15.3  15.9  11.9  13.5  14.3  13.3  13.7  1S.1  15.1
Quasi  Money  16.8  16.3  17.7  14.9  15.2  16.4  13.7  18.1  17.5  17.5
E. Balance of  Payments  (USS mill.)
Current  Account  *301.0  -739.0  -762.0  *527.0  *177.0  166.0  *51.0  3.0  3.0
Capital  Account  176.0  419.0  668.0  203.0  285.0  225.0  159.0  149.0  91.0
Errors  and  Omnissions  56.0  94.0  -43.0  5.0  28.0  40.0  -44.0  *6.0  14.0
Position  above  the  Line  *69.0  -226.0 *136.0  *319.0  136.0  99.0  64.0  140.0  102.0
Stock  of  Gross Reserves  326  269  224  187  156  208  217  264  224
.....................................................................................................................
Sources: Reserve Bank of  ZIebabwo, ministry  of  Finance of  Zimbabwe,  Schmidt-Nebbel (1990),  nd World  Bank Data7-7
Th.e  paper is orgarized  as tollows.  Section  2 presents 1980-1989  data for public  sector delicits
and liabilities,  necessary  for cl :ying out the decomposition  of public  sector deficits  and the analysis
of their sustainability  over time. Similarly,  these data are also required for subsequent  sections
devoted to the implications  of public  sector deficits  on private  sector spending,  the functioning  of
financial  markets  and the determination  of the exchange  rate and external  accounts.
Section  3 identifies  the main  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  policy  variables  which  have  contributed
to the above-the-line  NFPS deficit  calculated  in Section  2, focusing  in addition  on the sensitivity  of
the current public  finance  structure  to its main  determinants.  This shows,  among  other things,  how
a secular rise in domestic  debt has made domestic  interest payments  an important  component  of
public  sector  spending.  Also,  changes  in interest  rates and  tax regimes  prove  to affect  significantly  the
public  vector  deficit.
Next,  the focus  of Section  4 is  on the sustainability  of public  sector  deficits.  Deficit  magnitudes
consistent  with stable public liability  to GDP ratios were obtained for different macroeconomic
scenarios.  This exercise allowed us to conclude that current public sector deficits are clearly
unsustainable  under adverse  macro  shocks  or when  significant  devaluations  are required in response
to policy  changes.
The following  section analyses the  macroeconomic  impact of  public sector deficits as
transmitted  through  financial  asset markets The model  developed  and tested in this section  follows
Easterly's  (1989)  framework  but amended  in a way  that seems  appropriate  for the many  peculiarities
of the Zimbabwean  economy,  in particular  the combination  of a strict system  to allocate foreign
exchange,  a huge public  sector  deficit,  and  well  developed  financial  markets.  The empirical  evidence
supports some simulations  of different  deficit financing  strategies  that tend to indicate that debt
financing  would  only be postponing  inflationary  pressures.-8 -
Section  6 goes a step further  by analyzing  the impact  of the public  sector on private  sector
spendirng  "consumption  and investment)  and, therefore, with implications  for both short-term
stabilization  issues and long-run  growth prospects.  As it turns out, there is clear evidence  of a
crowding  out process,  especially  after 1t9J. But this crowding  o at  has been implemented  not only
through  an increased  interest rate,  but also by  applying  quantitatik  : constraints  on imports  that have
resulted  in a large excess  of private saving  over investmenL
Next,  Section  7 deals  with the effect of the public  sector deficit  and its financing  on external
accounts,  particularly  the trade deficit  and real  exchange  rates.  Here we follow  a model  by Rodrfguez
(1989) which again is modified  in order to take into account the  foreign exchange allocation
mechanism  and the binding  restraints  placed  on capital  movements.  In exploring  the determination
of external  accounts  and real exchange  rates, these Zimbabwean  features  make the levels  of public
sector deficits  and public  sector spending  more relevant  than deficit financing.
Section  8 deals  with  growth  prospects  and the supply  side effects  of public  sector deficits  and
other distortions
Finally,  section  9 concludes..9-
2.  CONSOLIDATED  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS  AND BALANCE  SHEETS,  1980-1989
This section  presents comprehensive,  consolidated  and stock-flow  consistent  data for public
sector deficits  and balance  sheets, required for carrying  out sensible  analyses  of decomposition  and
sustaikiability  of public sector deficits as well as for drawing  the implications  for private sector
spending,  discussed  in the followitig  sections.
The non-financial  public  sector (NFPS)  is comprised  by the central  government  (BUD) and
the rgegate  of the public  enterprises  and local authorities  (PLA). The financial  public  sector in
Zimbabwe  is mostly  comprised  by the Reserve  Bank  of Zimbabwe  (RBZ) and the Post Office  and
Savings  Bank (POSB). The latter financial  institutions  do not carry  out quasi-fiscal  operations  and
do not present  significant  deficits  or surpluses.  Hence the analysis  of the public  sector deficit  will  be
restricted  to the consolidated  NFPS. However,  consolidated  balance  sheets are presented for both
the NFPS  and the total public  sector,  the latter defined  as the consoldation  of the NFPS  and the two
above  mentioned  public  financial  institutions.  While  the decomposition  of the deficit  performed  in
section  3 below  is referred to the NFPS, the public  sector sustainability  analysis  in section  4 will  be
carried out for the total public  sector's  asset and liability  holdings.
The 1980-1988  data presented here is based on Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990),  which is the most
comprehensive  attempt to date to construct  consolidated  and stock-flow  consistent  data for non-
financial  public  sector deficits  and non-financial  and financial  public  sector balance  sheets. 2
2A first application  to Zimbabwe  of a framework  for macroeconomic  consistency  in current
and constant prices  for a six-sector  disaggregation  (for 1981  and 1987)  can be found in Khadr  and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989ab). An application  of the RMSM-X  macroeconomm.  consistency  model
for a 5-sector  disaggregation  to Zimbabwe,  covering  the 1985-1987  historical  period and the 1988-
1995  projections  period,  was done by Khadr,  McKay,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and Ventura (1989). A
significant  extension  of the former,  in terms  of behavioral  specification,  sector cisaggregation  and
period coverage  is the consistent  macroeconomic  general equilbrium model  for Zimbabwe  by
Elbadawi  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991a,b),  -with  base year 1988  and simulations  covcring  198I1995.- 10  -
Table  2.2  presents  data for consolidated  NFPS  deficit  and financing,  for the 1980/81  to 1989190
fiscal  years',  distinguishing  between  the central  government  (BUD) and public  enterprises  and local
authorities  (PLA) flows.  It reflects  the structure  of sectoral  and consolidated  above-the-line  nominal
deficit or excess of  investment  over saving (lines I - VII), and the structure of sectoral and
consolidated  below-the-line  financing  flows.' The above-the-line  deficit  structure  is presented  both
by  major budgetary items (current  expenditure, current  revenue, and  investment) and  by
disaggregating  between the primary  deficit and net interest payments. The notation for this and
subsequent  tables is defined  in table 2.1.
Table 2.3 shuws  the BUD, PLA and consolidated  NFPS balance  sheets aggregated  by major
economically  meaningful  categories  of liabilities  and assets  for June 30, 1980  to June 30, 1988. The
disaggregation  into cash balances,  net foreign  debt, net domestic  debt, and equity  holdings  will  be
useful  for performing  sustainability  analyses  in section  4 below.!
Note that the change  in the value  of the consolidated  NFPS net asset holdings  (line D in table
2.3, repeated as line IX in table 2.2) does not match  the nominal  deficit financing  flows  (line VII,
table 2.2) adjusted  for extraordinary  income  and foreign  grants  (lines  VIMLA  1 and 2, table
3The 1980/81  to 1988/89  data  nre  historical  series,  while  the 1989/90  figures  are budgetary
projections  of the Ministry  of Fnance.
'The source  of these figures  is the Ministry  of Fmance's  Fmancial  Statements. A detailed
discussion  of sources  and methodologies  for the data presented  in this section  is in Appendix  A.
The notation  is defined  in table Al, Appendix  A.
'More disaggregated  balance  sheets for BUD and PLA are presented  in Schmidt-Hebbel
(1990). The latter's table A3, appendix  A fr  BUD matches  the Ministry  of Finance's
disaggregation  of assets and liabilities  by types  of instruments  with a disaggregation  by holders
derived  from the balance  sheets  of the institutions  comprising  the financial  system  of Zimbabwe.
There is no direct source of information  for the consolidated  balance  sheet of PLA  The balance
sheet constructed  in Schmidt-Hebbel  (1990)  and presented  here combines  information  on PLA
liabilities  held  by BUD and the public  and private financial  institutions,  drawing  on BUD holdings
from the Ministry  of Fmance's  Fmancial  Statements  and on the financial  institL..ans'  holdings
from the Reserve Bank  of Zimbabwe's  Quarterly  Economic  and Statistical  Review.* Ii 
Tnble 2.1
VARIABLE  DEFINITONS
This table spclls  out the variable  definitions  and notations  used in tables 2.2 - 2.5.
Gen  eral Notation
BUD  Central Government
PLA  Parastatals  and Local  Authorities
RBZ  Reserve Bank  of Zimbabwe
POSB  Post Office  and Savings  Bank
S  Saving
I  Investment
Int Pays  Interest  Payments










CNI  Current Non-Interest
Ibo  Transfers  from BUD to PLA
SLbo  Stock  of Loans  from BUD to PLA
SLob  Stock  of Loans from  PLA to BUD
SEbo  Stock  of PLA  equity  held by BUD
Consolidated  NFPS Deficit  and Financing  (Table  2.2)
Budget  categories  in table 2.2 aggregate  the following  budget  items presented  by tables VI and
VII in the Ministry  of Fmance's  Fmancial  Statements:
Direct taxes  =  Taxes  on Income  and Profits
Indirect  Taxes  =  Sales  Tax + Excise  Dudes
Other Taxes  =  Customs  Duties + Betting  Tax + Other Taxes on Goods and
Services  + Miscelfaner.-w  Taxes
Other Revenue  =  Fees + Recoveries  of DM4iopment  Expenditure  +  Reserve
Bank Foreign  Resenre  Adjustment  Surplus + Other- 12  -
TABLE  2.2
ZIMBABWE
CONSOLIDATED  NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT  AND FINANCING
(Cucrent ZS millIon)
80s8t  81-82  82-83  83-84  8"-85  85-86  86-87  67-88  88-89
r.  CONS CNI DEF  62  -36.9  -101.6  -118.2  -229.8  -320.3  -313.1  -751.6  -869.8
I.A  BUD  CNI  DEF  ;44.8  -4.4  -84.1  65.1  44.4  48.5  180.6  -310.2  -417.8
1. Cur  NI  Expend  1036.9  1306.7  1619.6  1952.1  2082.6  2476.3  3007.9  3182.7  2666.4
1.1 Goods  +  Sorva  S98.6  763.3  910.1  1053.1  1111.3  1346.1  1761.2  2285.3  2682.6
Wages  374.6  473.3  558.5  621.4  681.6  824.6  1063.9  1516.9  1750
0th Goods  +  S  224  290  351.6  431.7  430.2  521.5  697.3  761.4  932.6
1.2 Transfs + Subs  438.3  543.4  709.5  899  970.6  1130.2  1246.7  697.4  983.8
Tbo  64.1  79.5  103.8  207.1  287.6  302.6  406.4  457.5  482
Oth Trans Subs  374.2  463.9  605.7  691.9  683.2  627.6  840.5  439.9  501.6
2. Curt NI Revenue  892.1  1311.1  1703.7  1867  2038.2  2427.5  2827.3  2492.9  4084.2
2.1 Tax Revenue  777.8  1233.6  1579.5  1743.6  1902.1  2247.7  2638.1  3110.I  3793.2
nirect  Taxes  '37.3  664.2  792.4  801.6  901.9  1069.6  1356.1  1666.4  1925.2
IndLcect Taxes  263.4  410.8  536.1  627.3  638.8  730.7  796.3  866.9  1082.7
0th Taxes  76.9  156.6  251  314.7  361.4  447.2  485.7  577  787.3
2.2 0th Inv+Pr Rev  3.7  3.6  15.6  18.1  5.9  5.7  10.3  14.9  16.6
2.3 0th Revenue  110.6  83.9  108.6  105.3  : 0.2  174.4  178.9  367.7  272.4
1.8 PLA CNI 08E  -82.8  -32.5  -17.5  -203.3  -274.2  -368.8  -493.7  -441.4  -452
1.1 Groas  CNI Doa  -18.7  47  66.3  3.8  13.4  -66.2  -87.3  16.1  30
1.2  ransfres (Tbo)  64.1  79.5  103.6  207.1  287.6  302.6  406.4  457.5  482
II. CONS NET  INT P  93.7  171.8  249.5  346.8  A31.1  554.2  647.7  749.8  908.2
II.A BUD NET  INT P  41.5  94.3  139.2  194.8  262.2  J37.7  396.1  465.9  588.2
1. Interest Pays  100.2  142.4  200.4  271.2  335.E  429.1  523.4  632.4  770.7
For Int Pays  24.7  33.5  58  109  115.4  148.8  166.9  180.6  204
Dow  Int Pays  75.5  108.9  142.4  162.2  240.1  280.3  356.5  451.8  566.7
Int Pays  SLob 1.83852  2.4821J8  3.325843 4.221924 5.706712 8.065691  11.47373 11.58909  13.40242
Oth Dom  Int P 73.66165 106.4178  139.0742 157.9781 224.3933 272.2343  345.0263 440.2109 553.0976
2. Interest Reas  56.7  46.1  61.5  76.4  93.3  91.4  127.3  166.5  162.5
Int Rees  $Lbo  52.873  42.95091 52.39122  62.53274 74.56684 69.03822 93.29452  125.5735  140.0814
0th IDP Racs  5.827005 5.149086  6.80867 13.86726 18.73316 22.36178  34.00546 40.92651  42.41859
II.B PLA NET  INT P  52.2  77.5  110.3  132  168.9  216.5  251.6  283.9  320
1. Interest Pays  54  60  113.6  156.2  174.6  224.6  262.1  S3.5  333.6
For lSt Pays  3.387274 19.90113  45.37979 95.20159 119.3542 105.3485  86.60688 92.93297 67.84192
Dom  let Pays  50.61273  60.09887 68.22021  60.69841 55.24576 119.2515  176.4931  212.567 245.7381
Int Pay SLbo  52.9  43  52.4  62.5  74.6  69  93.3  125.6  140.1
Oeh Dow III  -2.28727  17.09887  15.82021 -1.60159  -19.3542 50.25145  83.19312 86.96709  105.6361
2. Interest Rees  1.8  2.5  3.3  4.2  5.7  8.1  11.5  11.6  13.6
lot RaeJ SLob  1.8  2.5  3.3  4.2  5.7  8.1  11.5  11.6  13.6
0th Int Rees  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0- 13  -
TABLE 2.2 (Cont.)
ZIMBABWE
CONSOL:DATED  NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC SECTOR  DEFICIT  AND FINANCING
(Current  Z$  ellLoa)
80-81  81-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  P5-86  86-87  67-88  U8-89
III.  CONS  SAVING  -155.7  -134.9  -147.9  -228.6  -201.3  -233.9  -334.6  1.8  -38.4
IV.  CONS INVESTM  201.3  516.4  603.9  686.3  650.4  864.7  908.4  1072.4  1123
IV.A  BUD  INVEST  65.1  122.2  191.9  208.7  203.2  221.2  293.1  485  523
IV.8  PLA  INVEST  136.2  394.2  412  479.6  447.2  643.5  615.3  587.4  600
V. CONS  PRIM  DEF  263.3  479.5  502.3  570.1  420.6  544.4  595.-  320.8  253.2
V.A BUD  PRIM  DEP  209.9  117.8  107.8  293.8  247.6  269.7  473.7  174.8  105.2
V.8 PLA  P&M  DEF  53.4  361.7  394.5  276.3  173  274.7  121.6  146  148
VI.  CONS NET IIs  P  93.7  171.8  249.5  346.8  431.1  554.2  647.7  749.8  908.2
1.  NIP  For  Debt  28.08727  53.40113  103.3798  204.3016  234.7542  254.1485  253.5069 263.533  291.8619
2. NIP Dom Debt  65.61273  118.3989  146.1202  142.4984  196.3458  300.0515  394.1931 486.267  616.3381
VII.  CONS  NOM  DEP  357  651.3  751.8  916.9  851.7  1098.6  1243  1070.6  1161.4
VIII  CON  NON DEP  FI  356.9  650.9  751.7  917.3  652.3  1098.5  1241.6  1070.6  1161.2
VIllA  BUD  NO DEF  F  251.3  211.7  246.9  489  510.4  607.3  868.6  640.7  693.2
1.  Extraord Income  49.3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
2. Foreiga  Ocants  0  5.4  24.2  56.9  81.1  99.5  106.3  123.6  89.7
3.  Net  Finanacing  220.4  316  244.5  428.6  813.5  737.9  843.7  977.1  1045.4
3.1 Net  Por FLnanc  -25.4  -35  -181.1  50.6  489.2  211  213.5  149.6  128.8
3.2  Not  Dom FLnanci  245.8  351  425.6  977.8  324.3  526.9  630.2  627.5  916.6
4.  Net  LendLng  79.6  109.7  234.5  186.5  276.5  168.6  227.6  376.9  507.3
5. Net  Cash  Acour  -61.2  0  -212.7  -190  105.7  61.5  -146.4  83.1  -65.4
VIIBS  PLA NO  DEP  F  105.6  439.2  504.6  4*2.3  341.9  491.2  373.2  429.9  468
1.  Net For  FLnanctn  257.4  278.2  445.6  102.1  -86.2  -75.1  16.7  -10.9  0
2.  Net Dom Fin-Le  -151.8  161  59.2  326.2  426.1  566.3  356.5  440.8  468
VIIIC  CON  NO DEF F  356.9  650.9  751.7  917.3  352.3  1098.5  1241.3  1070.6  1161.2
1.  Extraord  Iaeem  49.3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
2. Foreign  Orants  0  5.4  24.2  56.9  81.1  99.5  106.3  123.6  69.7
3.  Net FinwacLn  246.4  645.5  514.6  670.4  876.9  1060.5  989.1  1030.1  1006.1
3.1  Not  For Vlnano  232  243.2  264.5  152.9  403  135.9  230.2  130.7  128.8
3.2 Not  Dom Fin-Le  14.4  402.3  250.3  517.5  473.9  924.6  756.9  691.4  677.3
4.  Net Cash  Mcum  -61.2  0  -212.7  190  105.7  61.5  -146.4  83.1  -65.4
Vill  CON  NOm  DEF Ft  356.9  650.9  751.7  917.3  652.3  1096.5  1241.8  1070.6  1161.2
IX. COO  CON NET  AS  -549.4  -537.3  -941.6  -683.7  -933  -373  -1136.5  -1119
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TABLE  2.3
Z'.3XiWE
CONSOLIDATED  NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  BALANCE  SHEET
(Cugrent  ZS  million)
June  80  June  81  June  82  Jun.  83  June  84  June  85  June  86  June 87  June  88
A.  BUD  NET ASSETS  -1074.3  -1364.2  -1582  -1973.6  -2463.6  -3084  -3646.5  -4424.5  -5121
1.  Assets  592.2  576.5  681  680.1  708.8  1090.8  1545.3  1712.4  2173.8
1.1  Cash  Balances  46  -16.8  -21.9  -258.3  -419.3  -315.2  -248.5  -395.4  -315.2
1.2  Loans  518.8  497.9  596.8  792.8  969.2  1235.6  1399.7  1609  1805.7
SLbo  467.3  444.6  510.9  648.9  774.6  933.3  1025.8  1213.5  1386
Oth Loan  51.5  53.3  85.9  143.9  194.6  302.3  373.9  395.5  419.7
1.3  EquLty  27.4  95.4  106.1  145.6  158.9  170.4  394.1  498.8  683.3
SEbo  26.9  62.3  70.6  102.1  99.2  104.7  323.2  423.6  598.7
Othec  EquLty  0.5  33.1  35.5  43.5  59.7  65.7  70.9  75.2  84.6
2.  Liabilities  1666.5  1940.7  2263  2653.7  3172.4  4174.8  5191.8  6136.9  7294.8
2.1  ForeLgn  Debt  364.6  488.5  678.8  909.5  1047.7  1735.2  2215.2  2515.2  2824.5
2.2  Domestic  Debt  1301.9  1452.2  1584.2  1744.2  2124.7  2439.6  2976.6  3621.7  4470.3
SLob  31.7  33.1  37  45.4  50.5  70.2  95.8  92.9  107.3
0th  Dom Debt  1270.2  1419.1  1547.2  1698.8  2074.2  2369.4  2880.8  3528.8  4363
B. PLA  NET  ASSETS  -788.5  -1048  -1367.5  -1917.7  -2311.4  -2624  -2934.5  -3293  -3715.5
1.  Assets  31.7  33.1  37  45.4  50.5  70.2  95.8  92.9  107.3
1.1  Loans  31.7  33.1  37  45.4  50.5  70.2  95.8  92.9  107.3
SLob  31.7  33.1  37  45.4  50.5  70.2  95.8  92.9  107.3
Other  Loon  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
2.  Liabilities  820.2  1081.1  1404.5  1963.1  2361.9  2694.2  3030.3  3385.9  3822.8
2.1  Foreign  Debt  50  290.2  531.1  795.2  1083.6  1228.5  1149.5  1155  1216.5
2.2  Domestic  Debt  743.3  728.6  802.8  1065.8  1179.1  1361  1557.6  1807.3  2007.6
SLbo  467.3  444.6  510.9  648.9  774.6  933.3  1025.8  1213.5  1386
0th  Dom Debt  276  284  291.9  416.9  404.5  427.7  531.8  593.8  621.6
2.3  EquLty  (SEb)  26.9  62.3  70.6  102.1  99.2  104.7  323.2  423.6  598.7
C. CONS  NET  ASSETS  -1862.8 -2412.2  -2949.5  -3891.3  -4775  -5708  -6581  -7717.5  -8836.5
1.  Cash  46  -16.8  -21.9  -258.3  -419.3  -315.2  -248.5  -395.4  -315.2
2.  Net  For  Debt  414.6  778.7  1209.9  1704.7  2131.3  2963.7  3364.7  3670.2  4041
3. Net  Dom  Debt  1494.7  1649.8  1753.2  1971.8  2284.1  2494.8  3038.7  3727.1  4564.9
4.  Equity  0.5  33.1  35.5  43.5  59.7  65.7  70.9  75.2  84.6
0. CEH  CONS  NET  AS  -549.4  -537.3  -941.8  -883.7  -933  -873  -1136.5  -1119
--- __ ..--..  ________.------........---______________-___---_____-_.____________._______...--....-----......-...-.....-.........----......---..............----........-------.........--......... 
_- l5-
2.2). Two main  reasons  for this stock-flow  inconsistency  can be mentioned:  statistical  errors (which
probably  are of secondary  importance)  and capital  gains  and losses  on domestic  and foreign  asscls
and liabilities,  which  affect  the changes  in the value  of public  net asset holdings  but not the financing
flows  of net cash outlays. One important  source  of capital  losses -- exchange  rate depreciations -
will  be considered  below.
Table 2.4 shows the implicit  interest rates paid on the public sector's asset and liability
holdings. 6 Interest rates paid on foreign  debt increased  from 6.8% in the early eighties  to almost
12%  in 1983-84,  to decline  subsequently  to 7.2% in 1988/89.
Interest rates paid by the central  government  on domestic  debt have  increased  continuously,
from 5.8% in  1980/81  to  12.7% in 1988/89. The interest paid on net domestic debt of the
consolidated  NFPS shows  an even steeper increase  throughout  the eighties,  from 4.4% to 13.5%.
This reflects  both that the central government's  interest receipts  on domestic  loans were paid  at a
relatively  flat rate during  the eighties  (around  10%),  and the steep increase  in interest rates paid  by
PLA on its domestic  debt held by the financial  sector and the non-financial  private sector.
Table 2.5 is the summary  table for this section. It presents  deficit and net liabilities  of the
consolidated  non-financial  and total public  sector  as ratios  to GDP. Figure  2.1 reflects  the evolution
of the primary  and total nominal  deficits  in Zimbabwe  during  the eighties,  while  figure  2.2 does the
same  for Zimbabwe's  domestic  and foreign  debt ratios.
After 1980/81,  public  sector deficits  grew  from less  than 10% of GDP to figures  around 13 -
14%  maintained  over a 6-year  span. Initially,  most of the increase  in the primary  deficit  took place
in the PLA  sector, to be followed  soon by an expansion  in the BUD primary  deficit. Continuously
'Current-period  interest rates are calculated  as current-period  fiscal-year  interest payments
divided  by the corresponding  preceding  end-of-period  (June 30) liability  or asset stocks. However
if actual interest payments  correspond  to the outstanding  asset or liability  value at a later date,
the rates presented in table 7 are biased  by the change  of the outstanding  stock at that date with
respect to the preceding  end-of-period  value.- 16.
increasing  nominal  interest rates on domestic  debt and rising  foreign debt/output ratios cxplain
continuously  rising  net interest payments  throughout  the eighties  and until today.
However,  starting  in 1987/88  a partial  rfcal adjustment  took place  in the budget,  reducing  thc
deficit  by 3.5 percentage  points  during  that fiscal  year  and an additional  percentage  point in 1988189,
allowing  a decline  of the consolidated  non-financial  sector deficit  to 10o in the latter year. While
this figure is still high, as will be judged in sections  4 and 5 below, it represents a significant
improvement  over the recent past.
The financing  requirements  of high public  sector deficits  have contributed to a steady and
massive  rise in public (total or consolidated  non-financial)  liabilities,  from 54.1%  of GDP in June
1980  to 86.4%  in June 1987. The lower  1987,'89  deficits  have  allowed  a slight  reduction  in the public
sector net liabilities  to GDP ratio in June 1988. An interesting  fact to note is that the composition
of public  debt has changed  drastically. During the early 1980s  public  deficits  relied massively  on
foreign  financing,  pushing  up the 7.4% foreign  debt to GDP ratio of the total public  sector in 1980
to reach a peak of 41.9%  in 1985.' This allowed  a reduction  in the domestic  debt to GDP ratio from
42.3%  in 1980  to a trough  of 26% in 1983. A strong  reversal  of the composition  of debt-financing
occurred  afterwards,  allowing  the foreign  debt ratio to fall by a couple  of percentage  points,  while
the domestic  debt ratio increased  to reach in 1988  levels  only  slightly  below  those observed  in 1980.
Monetary financing  of the  total public sector has been relatively  steady over the  1980s.
Consequently,  the base money  to GDP ratio,  after increasing  slightly  in the early 1980s  has remained
stable at around  6.4%.
'A similar  evolution  is observed  in the case of the non-rmancial  public  sector debt to GDP
ratios, as shown  in table 12 and figure 2.- 17  -
TABLE  2.4
ZIMBABWE
NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  INTEREST  RATES
80-St  81-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-a8  88-89
A.  CSNTRAL  GOVERNMENT  INTEREST RATES
1.  Rates  of  Int  Pays
1.1  On  Foc  Debt  0.067745  0.068577  0.085445  0.119846  0.110146  0.085754  0.075343  0.071803  0.072225
1.2  On  Dom Debt  0.057992  0.07499  0.089888  0.092994  0.113004  0.114896  0.119768  0.124748  0.12677
On SLob  0.057992 0.07499  0.089888  0.092994  0.113004  0.114896  0.119768  0.124748 0.12677
On  Oth  Dom D  0.057992 0.07499  0.089888  0.092994  0.113004  0.114890  0.119768  0.124748 0.12677
2. Rates  of Int  Rca,
2.1  On Dom.  Loans  0.113146  0.096606  0.102547  0.096367  0.096263  0.073972  0.090948 0.10348  0.101069
On SLbo  0.113146  0.096606  0.102547  0.096367  0.096265  0.073972  0.090948 0.10348  0.101069
On Oth Dom L  0.113146  0.096606  0.102547  0.096367  0.096265  0.073972  0.090948 0.10348  0.101069
B. PUBLIC  ENTERPRISES  AND LOCAL  AUTHORITIES
1. Races  of Int  Pays
1.1  On For Debt  0.067745  0.068577  0.085445  0.119846  0.110146  0.085754  0.075343  0.071803  0.072225
1.2  On Dom  Debt  0.068092  0.082485  0.084978  0.057139  0.046854 0.06702  0.113311  0.117616  0.122404
On SLob  0.113204  0.096716  0.102564  0.096317  0.096308  0.073931  0.090953  0.103502  0.101082
On Oth Dom  D<b-0.00829  0.060207  0.054197  -0.00384  -0.04785  0.117492  0.156437  0.146458  0.169945
2.  Rates  of Int  Recs
2?:  On Dom.  Loans  0.056782  0.075529  0.089189  0.092511  0.112871  0.115385  0.120042  0.124865  0.126747
On SLbo  0.056782  0.075529  0.089189  0.092511  0.112C71  0.115365  0.120042  0.124865  0.126747
C.  CONSOLIDATED  NON-FINANCIAL  PU8L1C SECTOR
1.  On Net  For  Debt  0.067745  0.068577  0.085445  0.119846  0.110146  0.085754  0.075343  0.071803  0.072225
2.  On Net  Dom  Debt  0.043897  0.071766  0.083345  0.072268  0.085962  0.120271  0.129724  0.130468  0.135017- 18  -
TABLE 2.5
213<MBWZ
CONSOLSDATED  PUBLIC SECTOR  DEIFICT  AND NEt LISAILITIES
A.  DEFICIT  AS PERCENSACE  OF ftSCAL  YtEAR  GDP
...  ... __._..........  _..  . ........................................  _____.................
80-81  81-82  62-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-88  65-89
CONS  NFPS DETICST  0.091  0.135  0.131  0.144  0.127  0.143  0.144  0.109  0.100
1.  Prlm  DefLeLt  0.067  0.100  0.087  0.090  0.063  0.071  0.069  0.033  0.022
Bud PrLm Def  0.054  0.024  0.019  0.046  0.037  0.035  0.055  0.018  0.009
PLA  Prim  Def  0.014  0.075  0.069  0.043  0.026  0.036  0.014  0.015  0.013
2. Net tat  Pays  0.024  0.036  0.043  0.055  0.064  0.072  0.075  0.077  0.078
NIP For  Debt  0.007  0.011  0.018  0.032  0.035  0.033  0.029  0.027  0.025
NIP  Dom Debt  0.017  0.025  0.025  0.022  0.029  0.039  0.046  0.050  0.053
CONS  TPS  DEFICIT  0.088  0.131  0.126  0.143  0.126  0.138  0.137  0.103  0.093
1.  Prim  Deficit  0.067  0.100  0.087  0.090  0.063  0.071  0.069  0.033  0.022
Bud  Pcim  Oaf  0.054  0.024  0.019  0.046  0.037  0.035  0.035  0.018  0.009
PLA  PrLm  Dot  0.014  0.075  0.069  0.043  0.026  0.036  0.014  0.015  0.013
2. Net Int  Pays  0.021  0.032  0.039  0.053  0.064  0.067  0.068  0.070  0.071
NIP  For  Debt  0.004  0.011  0.018  0.034  0.038  0.033  0.029  0.026  0.024
NIP  Dom Debt  0.016  0.021  0.020  0.019  0.025  0.034  0.040  0.045  0.047
B. PUBLIC SECTOR  LIABILITIES  AS PERCENTAGE  OF CALENDAR  YEAR  CDP
June  80  Jun  81  Jun.  82  June  83  Jun  84  June  85  June  86  June  87  June  88
CONS NFPS LIABILS  0.341  0.544  0.568  0.617  0.746  0.613  0.793  0.864  0.830
1. Cash  0.013  -0.004  -0.004  -0.041  -0.065  -0.043  -0.030  -0.044  -0.030
2.  Net  FPr  Debt  0.120  0.176  0.233  0.270  0.333  0.422  0.406  0.411  0.380
3.  Net  Dom Debt  0.434  0.372  0.337  0.313  0.357  0.355  0.366  0.417  0.429
4.  EquLty  0.000  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.008
CONS TPS  LIABILS  0.541  0.544  0.567  0.617  0.746  0.813  0.793  0.864  0.830
1.  Base  Money  0.038  0.061  0.064  0.057  0.059  0.058  0.060  0.064  0.064
2. Not Foe  Debt  0.074  0.169  0.237  0.289  0.366  0.419  0.393  0.393  0.365
3.  Not Dom  Debt  0.423  0.316  0.270  0.260  0.309  0.312  0.319  0.375  0.380
4.  Other  Llabs  -0.014  -0.004  -0.003  0.010  0.012  0.024  0.021  0.031  0.021
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3.  ECONOMIC  AND POLICY  DETERMINANTS  OF PUBLIC  SECTOR DEFICITS,
1980-1989
This section  presents  a decomposition  of Zimbabwe's  public  seck'- dericits  during  the
eighties  according  to the main  economic  and policy  determinants  of the deficit. In particular,
here we identify  the role played  by major  macroeconomic  domestic  and foreign  variables  as well
as by fiscal  policies,  in generating  the initial  expansionaty  phase  and the subsequent  partial riscal
adjustment  taking  place  since 1987/88.
The methodology  applied here to Zimbabwe,  based  on the framework  developed  by
Marshall  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989),  is developed  in the appendix. It starts  by identifying  the
main budgetary  items of the consolidated  non-financial  public  sector deficit. By making  use of
estimated  tax revenue functions,  the Fisher  equation  for domestic  interest rates, and simple
variable  transformations,  it is possible  to identify  the effect  of the main  macroeconomic  and policy
variables  on the deficit. This allows  us to measure  the sensitivity  of Zimbabwe's  public  budget
structure  to changes  in the macroeconomic  and policy  determinants.
3.1 Tax Revenue  Functicns
The methodology's  only  behavioral  equations  are tax revenue  functions. These are
estimated  separately  for direct taxes,  indirect  taxes,  and customs  duties using  fiscal  and fiscalized-
year data for 197017  to 1988/89.  Table 3.1 presents  the main  results.
Direct taxes depend positively on GDP (y) -- our proxy for the tax base  - inflation (x),
and the real exchange  rate (RER). The reason  that inflation  increases  real direct tax revenue is a
result of progressive  personal taxes  under non-indexed  tax bases -- the opposite effect  of the- 22 -
Table 3.1
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR TAX REVENUE FUNCFIONS
(1970/71  - 1988/89)
A.  Direct Taxes
dtt  = ao  + alyt  + a2iTC  + a3RERt  +  *e  a5DTR70t  + a6DTR82t  +  7 DTR88
Regression  a0 a,  a2 a3 a4 as  a6 cg  DW  R2A
1.  -205  0.160  277  91  -50  -118  -2  108  2.22  0.97
(-1.9)  (5.2)  (1.7)  (1.5)  (.2.1)  (-5.1) (-0.1)  (2.0)
2.  -209  0.161  280  92  -50  -118  - 105  2.23  0.97
(-3.2)  (7.7)  (1.9)  (1.7)  (-2.3)  (-5.4)  (4.1)
B.  Indirect Taxes
i tt  =  aO  +  Pl(yt  + 027t  +  I 3RERt  + p4CWt +  PsITR70  +  P6ITR81t
Regression  So  B0  B 2 a3  B4  4$  B6  DW  R2A
1.  -5  0.047  119  79  15  -91  106  2.08  0.99
(-0.1)  (3.2)  (1.4)  (2.5)  (0.9)  (-6.3)  (4.9)
2.  25  0.049  - 60  - -104  102  2.43  0.99
(0.6)  (3.5)  (2.1)  (-10.9) (5.8)
C.  Customs Duties
5;aie =  40+  y1impt  +  Y2CC  + y3CDR82c + y4CD.R83C  + y5CDR88t
Regression  yo  Yi  Y2  Y3  Y4  Vs  DW  R2A
1.  -73  0.100  63  83  149  228  1.70  0.96
(-2.2)  (3.6)  (0.8)  (4.0)  (14.6)  (12.2)
2.  -65  0.098  - 88  148  229  1.63  0.96
(-2.0)  (3.6)  (4.5)  (14.8)  (12.5)
Note:  All equations were estimated by ordinary least squares.  In addition, all equations
were estimated by maximum  likelihood in order to estimate the first-order residual
correlation coefficients, which were systematically  not significant at standard
confidence levels.- 23 -
Kcynes-Olivcra-Tanzi  effect  of innlation  negatively  affecting  (general)  tax revenue  when tax bases
are indexed  and tax payments  are subject  to significant  payment  lags,  t,ie latter combination  often
observed  in high-inflation  countries. A real exchange  rate depreciation  (a higher RER according
to our definitionof  the real exchange  rate) raises  direct tax revenue  probably  because  ex-post
direct tax rates are higher in the traded-goods  producing  sectors than in the non-traded  sectors.
Finally,  the 1978-1980  pre-independence  period  of conflict  (captured  by the CW dummy)
contributed  to an erosion in tax revenue,  while  the tax regime  change  in 1982  (DTR82)  had no
discernible  effects  on revenues  and the 1988  tax regime  change  (DTR88)  increased  tax revenue
significantly.
For indirect  tax revenue GDP was also used as the relevant  tax base. A fraction  of
indirect  taxes  are set in nominal  currency  units per unit sold,  hence inflation  should  affect
negatively  this part of indirect  tax revenue. However,  aggregate  indirect  taxes  are positively
(though  not significantly)  affected  by the rise in the GDP deflator. As in the case  of direct taxes,
a real exchange  rate depreciation  raises  revenue. During  the 1970171-1975/76  period indirect  tax
revenue fell as compared  to the 1976n7-1980/81  years,  while  after 1980  revenue rose with the
new 1980/81  tax regime,  as reflected  by the corresponding  tax regime  dummies. 8
For customs  duties the relevant  tax base is imports  (imp),  with a marginal  tariff rate of
about 10% for the 1970171  - 1981/82  period. Changes  in the customs  tax regime  in 1982,  1983,
and 1988  (reflected  by dummies  CDR82,  CDR83,  and CDR88)  (refelcted  by dummies  CDR82,
CDR83,  and CDR88) raised  revenues  in customs  duties gradually  above  that 10% level.
tThe ITR70 dummy  covers  the 1970/71  - 1975/76  period,  while  the ITR81  covers 1981/82  -
1988/89.  The non-significant  level  of CW (which  stands  for a separate 1978/79  - 1980J81  dummy)
suggests  that indirect  taxes  did not fare worse  during  those years  as compared  to 1976077  -
197778.- 24 -
3.2 Decomposition  of the Public  Sector Deficit
According  to the methodology  spelled  out in the appendix,  table 3.2 presents  the annual
(fiscal-year)  changes  in the main  economic  and policy  determinants  of the consolidated  NFPS
over fiscal  years 1981/82  - 1988/89.  The domestic  macroeconomic  variables  considered  are real
GDP, real imports,  real interest rate paid  on domestic  NFPS  debt, inflation  (as measured  by the
rate of change  of the GDP deflator),  and the real exchange  rate.  The only foreign  variable
considered  is the nominal  interest rate paid  on NFPS foreign  debt!'
Finally,  the set of policy  variables  is comprised  by the real domestic  and foreign  debt
stocks,  three budgetary  current expenditure  variables  (wages,  expenditure  on other goods  and
services,  and transfers  and subsidies),  six tax regime  variables,  the gross  current non-interest
primary  deficit  of public  enterprises  and local authorities,  and NFPS investment  expenditure.
With regard to the latter set of variables,  which  are under (higher)  control  of fiscal  policy
makers,  table 3.2 shows  that real wages  and expenditure  on other goods  and services  increased
massively  throughout  the 1980s,  while  transfers  and subsidies  were cut down  during the late 1980s.
Indirect  tax revenue  increased  with the 1981  tax regime  change  and customs  duties were raised in
1982,  1983  and again  in 1988  as a result of regime  changes. The PLA deficit  hovered  around
zero during the 1980s. NFPS investment  more than doubled  in 1981/82,  without  a clear trend
afterwards,  excepting  a further,  significant  increase  in 1985186.  The evolution  of public  debt
stocks,  a result of below-the-line  financing  needs and its composition,  was already  discussed  in
section  2: while  NFPS real foreign  debt grew  massively  during  the early 1980s,  its role was taken
over by real domestic  indebtment  after the mid 1980s.
'It is not clear - and we did not attempt to identifyi  - how the deficit is affected  by changes
in Zimbabwe's  external  terms  of trade.25  -
Table  3.3 decomposes  the  changes  in NFPS  deficit  to GDP ratios  according  to the
changes  in the main  budgetary  variables,  consistent  with the NFPS  deficit  figures  of table 2.2.
The table distinguishes  between  the main  budgetary  changes  included  in our decomposition
("included  budget  variables")  and the changes  in variables  excluded  from the analysis  ("excluded
budget  variables")  due to their either minor  or unsystematic  role. The changes  in the former  set
of variables  is exactly  consistent  with equation  (4) in the appendix.
Table  3.4 presents  the final  result of the decomposition,  which  allows  to identify  the
changes  in the consolidated  NFPS according  to their underlying  macroeconomic  and policy  causes.
To illustrate  the usefulness  of this approach,  we will  briefly  discuss  the role of the main  variables
in the 1987/88  - 1988/89  partial fiscal  adjustment  in Zimbabwe.
GDP growth  was the main macroeconomic  variable  contributing  to deficit reduction
during  the two last fiscal  years. Its positive  effect  on tax bases (the "economic  effect"  in line 2)
reduced  the deficit  by 0.5-1.2  percentage  points  of GDP, in addition  to the 0.4-0.9  percentage
point reduction  due to the simple  fact that the deficit and every  budgetary  item are expressed  as
ratios to GDP (the "denominator  effect"  in line 3).  Other macro  variables  (apart of imports,
whose  decline  in 1987/89  increased  the deficit)  tended to cause minor  changes  of opposite signs  in
these last two fiscal  years.
Among  fiscal  variables,  a major stabilization  effort was obtained  by reducing  significantly
transfers  and subsidies  in 1987/88,  and by increasing  revenue  from customs  duties in 1988/89.
However,  other variables  under control of policy  makers  contributed  to an increase  in the deficit:
the budgetary  wage  bill expanded  significantly,  and to a lesser  extent higher  expenditure  on goods
and services  and a higher  PLA deficit increased  the NFPS  deficit. In addition,  the secular  rise in
domestic  debt raised  domestic  interest payments.- 26  -
TABLE  3.2
ZIMBABWE
CHANGES  OF ECONOMIC  AND  POLICY
DETERMINANTS  OF CONSOLIDATED  NON-FINANCIAL
PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS
C1-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-88  88-89
1. DomestLc  Varlables
Real  GOP (YO)  0.075  0.021  -0.002  0.024  0.047  0.006  0.025  0.057
Real Lmpo(it
0p)  0.122  -0.043  -0.068  -0.002  0.040  -0.024  -0.083  0.000
Domestlc  (dr)  0.008  -0.013  0.045  0.095  -0.022  -0.025  0.017  -0.012
Domesttc  (dpL)  0.020  0.024  -0.056  -0.081  0.056  0.034  -0.016  0.016
Real  e*xch(RERO)  0.030  0-72  0.201  0.269  0.104  -0.075  -0.016  0.051
2.  Forelgn  Variables
Forelgn  n(dL*)  0.001  0.017  0.034  -0.010  -0.024  -0.010  -0.004  0.000
3.  Forelgn  Varlables
ForeLgn  r((D*/P*)O)  0.594  0.241  0.055  -0.044  0.159  0.094  0.003  -0.066
DomestLc  ((D/P)
0)  -0.035  -0.090  0.011  0.124  0.005  0.086  0.110  0.092
Wage  bill((WBIP)@)  0.105  0.010  0.000  0.064  0.113  0.150  0.290  0.028
Goods/ser((CSIP)*)  0.132  0.038  0.104  -0.033  0.115  0.192  -0.003  0.082
Transfers(CTSIP)0)  0.084  0.118  0.027  -0.042  0.114  -0.095  -0.526  0.017
PoLitical(dCW)  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1988  dire(dDTRSS)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000
1981  indi(dSTR81)  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1982  cust(dCDR82)  0.000  1.000  -1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1983  cust(dCDR83)  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -1.000
1988  cus3t(CDR88)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000
PLA  prima((PDIP)O)  -3.198  0.572  -0.960  2.421  -5.545  0.176  -1.167  0.661
NFPS inve((IIP)O)  1.243  0.001  0.025  -0.083  0.223  -0.063  0.068  -0.066
---------- _-----------------,_-,-_----_----.-.--.--_---...--_______--__--_---___----___----
Note:  rc  denotes  a*nual  rate  of chaeng
c denotes  annual  change.- 27  -
TABLE 3.3
ZIMBA3WE
DECOMPOSITION  OF THE CHANGES  IN CONSOLIDATED
NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC SECTOR  DEFICITS,
ACCORDING  TO CHANGES  IN BUDGETARY  VARIABLES
(  Ratlos  to  GDP )
81-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-88  88-89
I.  CHGS  OF  INCLUDED  BUDGET  VARIABLES
Wage  bLIL  0.003  -0.001  0.000  0.004  0.006  0.016  0.032  -0.004
Goods/servlces  0.003  0.001  0.007  -0.004  0.004  0.013  -0.002  0.002
TransferslsubsL  0.001  0.009  0.003  -0.007  0.007  -0.011  -0.053  -0.002
Direct  taxes  0.026  0.000  -0.012  0.008  0.006  0.017  0.013  -0.004
Indirect  taxes  0.018  0.008  0.005  -0.003  0.000  -0.003  -0.004  0.005
Customs  dutles  0.014  0.011  0.006  0.002  0.005  -0.002  0.002  0.008
PLA primary def  0.015  0.005  -0.014  0.001  -0.011  -0.001  0.012  0.001
Net  interest  pa  0.004  0.007  0.014  0.003  -0.006  0.000  -0.002  -0.002
Net interest  pa  0.008  0.001  -0.003  0.007  0.014  0.002  0.004  0.003
NFPS  investment  0.056  -0.002  0.003  -0.011  0.016  -0.008  0.004  -0.013
Sum of  chas.  of  0.031  0.001  0.011  -0.014  0.020  -0.001  -0.017  -0.023
II.  CHGS.  OF EXCLUDED  BUDGET  VARIABLES
Other  taxes  -0.001  0.000  -0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001
Other  revenue  -0.013  0.004  -0.002  0.003  0.001  0.000  0.003  -0.001
Other  lnveStMen  -0.000  0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000
RBZ  foreign res  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  -0.002  0.014  -0.013
Sum of  chgs.  of  0.014  -0.006  0.002  -0.003  -0.003  0.002  -0.018  0.013
CHG  CONSOLIDATE  0.044  -0.005  0.013  -0.017  0.017  0.000  -0.045  -0.008- 28  -
TA3LE 3.4
ZIM3ABWE
DECOMPOSITION  OF  THE  CHANGES  IN CONSOLIDATED
NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC SECTOR  DEFICITS,
ACCORDING  TO CHANCES  IN ECONOMIC  AND  POLICY DETERMINANTS
(  Ratios  to  CDP )
81-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-88  88-89
----.-- _--_--------------__--_---------_----------___------------_.__---_-_--__--__-_------
1.  Changes  Due to Domestic  Variables
Real  GDP (YO)  -0.009  -0.003  0.000  -0.004  -0.007  -0.001  -0.004  -0.009
Real GDP (YO)  -0.016  -0.004  0.000  -0.005  -0.010  -0.001  -0.005  -0.012
Real Lmpo(LmpO)  -0.012  0.004  0.007  0.000  -0.004  0.002  0.008  0.000
Domestic  (dr)  0.003  -0.004  0.014  0.029  -0.007  -0.009  0.006  -0.005
Domestic  (dP4)  0.006  0.007  -0.013  -0.020  0.015  0.010  -0.005  0.005
Real  .xch(RERO)  -0.001  -0.003  -0.009  -0.018  -0.008  0.005  0.001  -0.003
2.  Changes  Due  to Foreign  Variables
Forcisn  nCdL*)  0.000  0.003  0.007  -0.003  -0.008  -0.004  -0.001  0.000
3.  Changes  Due  to  Policy  Variables
Foreign  r((DI/P*)O)  0.004  0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.006  0.003  0.000  -0.002
Domestic  ((D/P)O)  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.004  0.005  0.005
Wage bill((WBIP)*)  0.010  0.001  0.000  0.00@  0.011  0.016  0.036  0.004
Goodslser((GSIP)O)  0.008  0.002  0.006  -0.002  0.007  0.013  -0.000  0.006
Transfers((TSJP)*)  0.008  0.011  0.003  -0.005  0.012  -0.010  -0.051  0.001
PoLLtical(dCW)  -0.014  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1988  dirL(dDTR88)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.024  0.000
1981  Indi(dITR81)  -0.028  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1982  cust(dCDR82)  0.000  -0.022  0.022  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
1983  cust(4CDR83)  0.000  0.000  -0.037  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.034
1988  cust(dCDR88)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.052
PLA prima((PDIP)*)  0.015  0.006  -0.014  0.001  -0.011  -0.002  0.012  0.001
NFPS inve((I/P)O)  0.064  0.000  0.003  -0.009  0.022  -0.007  0.007  -0.007
SUM  OF CHOS.  DUZ TO  0.038  -0.003  -0.010  -0.026  0.018  0.020  -0.016  -0.034
CHGS. DUE TO OTSER  0.006  -0.002  0.023  0.008  -0.001  -0.020  -0.028  0.026
C____CONSOL._._TED____0.0__-0._.00___0.__1_-0.01______0.0_....__._.000_._____-.0____-.00___
CHC CONSOLIDATED  UP  0.044  -0.005  0.013  -0.017  0.017  0.000  -0.045  -0.008
----. ___---__----___---___  ...-..-----...---......--..--..---......-----...-..-..-.---. __.____....---..--..  __  .... _  __-.-..-  _-
-_.___---_  .---...-......--...---- ___---_  .______  ..-......-....... _--..-  _______.____._---......----...-..-........---.  ._-..--____.*29-
3.3 Sensitivity  of the Deficit  to Economic  and Policy  Determinants
More interesting  than a historical  comparison  is to identify  the structural  sensitivity  of
Zimbabwe's  NFPS  deficit to its main  determinants.  Table 3.5 computes  measures  of the
responsiveness  (or semi-elasticities)  of the deficit  to changes  in underlying  macroeconomic
andpolicy  variables,  computed  as absolute  changes  of the NFPS  deficit (in percentage  points  of
GDP) for 1% (or 1 percentage  point) changes  in the corresponding  determinants  in the recent
past.'° These elasticities  reflect  the share in the budget  of the corresponding  budgetary  variable
(which  may  change  over time)  and, in the case  of the behavioral  tax revenue functions,  the size of
the corresponding  (estimated  as time-invariant)  coefficients.
The deficit appears  to be quite sensitive  to changes  in macroeconomic  variables. Its semi-
elasticity  with respect to GDP is -0.37  (the sum  of the denominator-elasticity  of -0.16  and the
economic  elasticity  of 4.21), only  surpassed  by that of the domestic  real interest rate (0.40). Thc
responsiveness  with respect to inflation  is also relatively  high (031), which  is lower  than the real
interest rate semi-elasticity  due to the negative  effect  of inflation  on the deficit  via raising  direct
taxes,  which  reduces  somewhat  its positive  effect on the deficit  via higher domestic  interest
payments. Slightly  lower  (0.25)  is the semi-elasticity  of the deficit  with respect to foreign  nominal
interest rates. Fnally, it is interesting  to note that the deficit  is only  wealdy  responsive  to the real
exchange  rate. A 1% real depreciation  will reduce  the deficit  by 0.06  percentage  points of GDP;
ie. the strong  effect  on the deficit  via higher interest payments  on foreign  debt is almost
neutralized  by the higher tax revenue,  as both direct and indirect  tax payments  are boosted  by a
depreciation.
*The  semi-elasticities  were computed  for 1987/88  - 1988189.  If the semi-elasticities  changed
over the 1980s,  the values  for the early 190s (1981/82-1982*3)  were added in parentheses  after
the 1987/88  - 1988/89  values-30  -
Among policy variables, changes in tax regimes (due to higher tax burdens or strictcr
controls of evasion) tend to affect the NFPS deficit significantly. This is not adequately captured
by the corresponding semi-elasticities,  which have varied between 1.4 and 5.2"  Among
expenditure variables, by decreasing order of importance there are the wage bill, investment,
transfers/subsidies  and expenditure on other goods and services. Finally, although it has been
omitted from the table, a change in the PLA primary non-interest current deficit is obviously  of
enormous importance, as the consolidated NFPS deficit changes 1 by 1 with the former.
The preceding discussion has shed light on the sensitivity of Zimbabwe's public finances to
the major macroeconomic and fiscal policy determinants of the deficit.  Future fiscal programming
and stabilization efforts could be based on this kind of quantitative framework, which
complements the usual policy considerations with a clear identification of the effectiveness of
policy instruments.
"Take, for instance, the 1988 customs duties regime change (d CDR88), which implied a
staggering deficit reduction of 5.2 percentage points of GDP in 1988/89 (see table 3.4).  Dividing
it by the corresponding change in the dummy  (=1.0, see table 3.2), a huge semi-elasticity  of -5.2 is
obtained.-31
Table 3.5
SENSITIVITY OF NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICITS
TO CHANGES IN ECONOMIC AND POLICY DETERMINANTS
CHANGES IN ECONOMIC AND POLICY  CHANGES IN NFPS DEFICIT
DETERMINANTS  (Percentage Points of GDP)
1. Domestic Variables
1% growth Real GDP: Denominator Effect  -0.16
Economic Effect  -0.21
1% growth Real Imports  -0.10
1 pp. Increase Domestic Real Interest Rate  0.40 (0.30)
1 pp. Increase Domestic Inflation  0.31
1% growth Real Exchange Rate  -0.06 (-0.04)
2.  Foreiun Variables
1 pp. Increase Foreign Nominal Interest Rate  0.25 (0.18)
3.  Policy Variables
1% growth Foreign Real Debt  0.03 (0.01)
1% growth Domestic Real Debt  0.05 (0.02)
1% growth Real Wage Bill  0.14 (0.10)
1% growth Goods/Services Expenditure  0.07
1% growth Transfers/Subsidies  0.10
Change 1980 Political Regime  -1.4
Change 1988 Direct Tax Regime  -2.4
Change 1981 Indirect Tax Regime  -2.8
Change 1982 Customs Duties Regime  .2.2
Change 1983 Customs Duties Regime  -3.5
Change 1988 Customs Duties Regime  -5.2
1% growth NFPS Investment  0.10 (0.05)
Notes
1.  The changes in NFPS deficits were obtained by dividing the 1987/88  - 1988/89  change in the
deficit caused by the corresponding economic or policy determinant (as reflected by table
3.4) by the change in the corresponding determinant (as reflected by table 3.2).  The values
in parentheses refer to 1981/82 - 1982/83  when they differ from the 1987/88  - 1988/89 levels.
2.  pp denotes percentage points.
3.  The changes in political and tax regimes are measured by the changes in the corresponding
dummies estimated by the tax revenue functions, as shown in table 3.1.32 -
4.  SUSTAINABILITY  OF THE DEFICIT
This section focuses  on obtaining  bounds for sustainable  deficits  of the public  sector.  The
sustainability  concept  applied  here refers  to the feasibility  of the dynamic  path  of public  liabilities  for
given  demands  by the domestic  private and foreign  sectors for these Uabilities.  It follows  work  on
fiscal  sustainability  developed  by Buiter (1983,  1985)  and van Wijnbergen  (1989),  with applications
by van Wijnbergen,  Anand and Rocha (1988)  to Turkey  and by De Melo (1990)  to Morocco.
The analysis  starts  with the standard  equation for the consolidated  total public  sector current
price deficit and its financing,  as ratios to current-price  GDP:
(4.1)  PD  4 +  i  B  +  E  i'* F*  H  +  L+  E  }  6L
Py  Py  Py  Py  PY  PY  PY
where PD is the consolidated  total public  sector primary  dericit,  P is  the GDP deflator,  y is real  GDP,
i is the domestic  nominal  interest rate, B is the domestic  public  debt  stock,  E is  the nominal  exchange
rate, i  is the foreign  nominal  exchange  rate, F  is the foreign  public  debt stock  (in foreign  currency
units),  H is total base money,  and OL is other public  liabilities.  Dots  over variables  denote absolute
(not relative)  rates of change per time unit.'
By making  use of the relations  between changes  in current-price  public  liabilities  and changes
in the liability  to GDP ratios, rewrite  equation  (4.1) to obtain:
(4.2)  pd  +  (r  +  P) b  +  i*  f  =  fi  + h (P + 9)  + h  +  b  (P + fO) 
+ P + f  (-a  + P*  + 9)  + 61  + ol  (P  + P)
"1Below,  hats denote relative  rates of change  and lower-case  letters denote ratios  of the
corresponding  variables  to current price GDP; for instance,  pd is equal to PD/(P y) and f is
defined  as (E F)/(P y). The real exchange  rate, denotsl by e, is defined  as (E P*/P),  and  the real
domestic  and foreign  interest rates,  denoted by r and r*, respectively,  are defined  according  to the
Fisher  equations  in their simple  linear form..33 -
Now  let's introduce  the steady-state  notion  of fixed  public  liability  to GDP ratios. A sustainable
deficit  is hence defined  as a level  consistent  with maintaining  unaltered  holdings  of public  liabilitics,
in proportion  to GDP, by domestic  private  and foreign  creditors. Imposing  this condition
(A = 0  = 1; = t  - 61)  and after simple  re-arranging  of (4.2),  obtain  the following  expression
for the sustainable  primary  deficit:
(4.3)  pd  =  h  P +  hg  9  b  (9  - r)  + f  (9-r*)  - f  8  +ol  (P +  9)
Equation  (4.3)  states that the primary  deficit  level  which  can be sustained  over time  results  from
the following  six  financing  sources:  inflation  tax  on base money,  seigniorage  from  GDP growth  effects
on base money  demand,  the excess  of domestic  growth  over the domestic  real interest rate affecting
domestic  debt, the excess  of domestic  growth  over the foreign  real interest  rate affecting  foreign  debt,
capital  gains  on foreign  debt resulting  from  real exchange  rate appreciations  (implying  e less  than  0),
and inflation  tax cum  seigniorage  on other liabilities.
Table  4.1  presents  simulation  results  for sustainable  public  sector  deficits  in Zimbabwe,  consistent
vith the structure  of its public  finances  and with its recent evolution  of macroeconomic  variables.
The first  part of the table presents  the recent  evolution  of the relevant  macroeconomic  variables
required for applying  equation (4.3).  This helps us to identify  reasonable  values for the base,
favorable  and unfavorable  scenarios  considered  in section  3 of the table. Next the ratios to GDP of
the four main liabilities  of the consolidated  total public  sector at the most recently  available  date
(June 1988,  obtained from table 2.5), are presented, which  will be used as the relevant constant
liability  ratios for the simulations.
As mentioned  above,  three scenarios  are considered.  The first  is a base scenario,  which  assumes
GDP growth  and real interest  rates broadly  consistent  with  the recent  Zimbabwean  experience,  while* 34 -
the real  exchange  rate is  maintained  at its current  level. Under  a favorable  scenario,  growth  incrcases
by  one percentage  point  and the domestic  real  interest  rate falls  by  one percentage  point  as comparcd
to the base scenario.  The unfavorable  fiscal  scenario  implies  lower  growth,  higher  real interest  rates,
and a real exchange  rate depreciation  of 7%.
Changes  in growth  and interest  rates have  the strongest  effects  on the sustainable  public  sector
deficit due simply  to the fact that domestic  and foreign  debt stocks are high as compared  to base
money  and other public  liabilities.  In addition,  capital  losses  on the foreign  debt  due to real  exchange
rate devaluations  can limit  severely  sustainable  deficits,  as shown  in the unfavorable  scenario.
Under the base scenario,  the sustainable  primary  public  deficit  is estimated at 1.7%  of GDP,
increasing  slightly  to 2.9% under the favorable  case,  and dropping  significantly,  to -4.2%,  under the
unfavorable  scenario. The total nominal  deficits  vary accordingly.
The actual 1988/89  primary  deficit  of 2.2%  of GDP (see table 2.5)  is  at the mid-point  of the base
and favorable  scenarios,  and exceeds  the unfavorable  scenario  deficit  by the significant  amount  of 6.4
percentage  points. The nominal  deficits  of the base and unfavorable  cases are quite similar  to the
actual total public  sector and NFPS nominal  deficits (see table 2.5) but, again, the unfavorable
scenario shows  a sustainable  nominal  deficit  which is almost  5 percentage  points below the latter
measures.
Hence  we may  conclude  that while  current  public  sector  deficits  in Zimbabwe  may  be sustainable
from the limited  perspective  of constant  liability  to GDP ratios  and under  macroeconomic  conditions
ranging  from  normal  to favorable,  they  are clearly  unsustainable  under  adverse  macro  shocks  or when
significant  devaluations  are required  in response  to policy  changes.- 35  -
TABLE  4.1
ZIMBA3WE
SUSTAINABLE  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT
1.  MACROECONOMIC  VARIABLES
86-87  87-88  88-89
GDP growth  (y°)  -0.038  -0.014  0.044
Domestic  Inflation  (PC)  0.172  0.148  0.137
DomestLc  Nominal  Interest  Rate (L)  0.130  0.130  0.135
Domestic  Real Interest  Rate  (cr)  0.042  0.018  0.002
ForegLn  Nominal  Interest  Rate (0*)  0.075  0.072  0.072
Foreign  Inflation  (P*O)  0.022  0.042  0.045
Foreign  Real Interest  Rate (r*)  0.013  0.030  0.028
Domestlc  Devaluation  (EO)  0.015  0.044  0.129
Real  Exchange  Rate  DeprecLation  (*e)  -0.114  -0.053  0.037
2.  CONSOLIDATED  TOTAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  LIABILITIY-GDP  RATIOS  AT JUNE  1988
Total  Base  Money  0.065
Net  ForeLgn  Debt  0.380
Net DomestLc  Debt  0.365
Other  Liabilities  0.021
3. SUSTAINABLE  NON-FINANCIAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICITS
Base  Favorab Unfavor
Scenario  Scenario  Scenario
GDP growth  (yO)  0.040  0.050  0.020
Domestic  Inflation  (PC)  0.110  0.110  0.110
Domestic  Nominal  Interest  Rate tl)  0.140  0.130  0.170
DomestLc  Real Interest  Rate (r)  0.030  0.020  0.060
Foreign  Nominal  Interest  Rate (ii)  0.080  0.080  0.090
Foreign  Inflation  0.040  0.040  0.040
Foreign  Real  Interest  Rate (r*)  0.040  0.040  0.050
Real  Exchange  Rate Depreciation  (*0)  0.000  0.000  0.070
InfLatLon  Tax  th  P1O  0.007  0.007  0.007
SeignLorage  lh  y°|  0.003  0.003  0.001
Domestic  Debt  Effect (b (ye-r)I  0.004  0.011  -0.015
Foreign  Debt  Effect Cf  Cy0-r*))  0.000  0.004  -0.011
ForeLgn  Debt Capital  Gain C-f  e@l  0.000  0.000  -0.027
Other  Liabs.  Effect  Eol (P@G+yO)  0.003  0.003  0.003
Sustainable  Primary  Deficit  0.017  0.029  -0.042
Interest  Pays  on ForeLgn  Debt (C*  f)  0.029  0.029  0.033
Interest  Pays  on Domestic  Debt (L b)  0.053  O.C49  0.065
Sustainable  Nominal  Deficit  0.099  0.107  0.056*36-
S. DEFICIT  FINANCING  AND FINANCIAL  MARKETS
This  section  discusses  the macroeconomic  impact  of public  sector  deficits  on financial  markets
in Zimbabwe.  The model  developed  below  is a simple  version  of Easterly  (1989),  which  places  the
main  emphasis  on the determination  of the real interest and inflation  rates and where the money
demand  is  the main  behavioral  piece. Our framework  incorporates  additional  features  peculiar  to the
Zimbabwean  economy,  in particular  the combination  of a strict system  to allocate  foreign  exchange,
a huge public  sector deficit,  and well  developed  financial  markets.
The stylized  facts that support our way  of modeling  financial  markets and their relation  to
public  sector  deficits  and inflation  are the following.  First,  private  consumption  and  private  investment
are limited  by the bare availability  of foreign  goods,  most  of which  have  no close  domestic  substitutes.
Second,  private  saving  is unusually  high for developing  countries  similar  to Zimbabwe  - about 20%
of GDP in the last four  years.  Third, private  saving  has significantly  and increasingly  exceeded  private
investment  in the last four years.  Fourth,  due to strict restrictions  on capital  outflows,  not much  of
the high  private  saving  leaves  the country.  Fifth,  the public  sector  deficit  was  rarely  below  10%  during
the 1980s.  Sixth,  real interest rates have been consistently  negative  or close to zero for many  years,
although they show an equally  consistent upward trend; while nominal  interest rates have been
controlled  to a large  extent,  no clear sign  of excess  demand  for credit  has arisen.  Seventh,  the current
account  deficit has been reduced to figures  close to zero in recent years and Zimbabwe  has been
transferring  resources to developed countries in net terms. Eighth, the inflation rate has been
moderate - between 10 and 20% - during the 1980s.
The interpretation  of these  stylized  facts,  which  is taken up again  in section  6 on consumption
and investment,  goes like this: the centralized  foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism  effectively
constrains  private consumption  and private investment,  with respect  to what would  result with less- 37 -
restricted  access  to foreign  exchange.  Zimbabweans  are not able to substitute  domestic  goods for
foreign goods to the extent that total private consumption  and total private investment  do not
decline.  The restriction  on aggregate  private  consumption  implies  that effective  private  saving  exceed
"notional"  saving  levels" 3. Similarly,  the restriction  on private  investment  leads  to an effective  private
investment  less than a "notionar level.  Both factors  together  explain  the high private  sector surplus
observed  in the last four to five years.  This,  in turn, helps  to understand  two related stylized  facts:
first,  the non-inflationary  and  exclusively  domestic  financing  of the public  sector deficit,  which  in gross
terms  has been similar  to the private  sector surplus;  and second,  the sustained  negative  or low real
interest rates - albeit  slightly  increasing  - with no sign  of excess  demand in credit markets.
In the end, financial  markets  have played  the role of transferring  the private sector surplus
to the public  sector such that the latter is able to cope with its deficit.  This has been facilitated  by
several  regulations  in the financial  markets  that make  such  transfer  somewhat  compulsory,  and  by low
real interest rates resulting  from both the abundance  of private  saving  and an adequate monetary
policy  management.
As said above, the financial  system in Zimbabwe  is exceptionally  deep for a developing
country of its characteristics.  Monetary assets amount to more than 40%o  of GDP, while other
financial  institutions  - excluding  institutional  investors  - add assets by an amount close to 25% of
GDP. And despite that the Ml to GDP ratio is rather low and unstable, there is a plethora of
institutions  comprising  the monetary  sector:  the Reserve  Bank of Zimbabwe,  two discount  houses,
five commercial  banks and accepting  houses.  The non-monetary  sector is comprised  by building
societies (mortgage  companies),  finance houses, the public Post Office Saving Bank, insurance
companies,  and pension funds.  This sector is significantly  larger than the monetary  sector, in part
MThat  is, the saving  level that would  result if the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism  were
not binding  for private consumption.*38 -
because  the institutional  investors  - insurance  companies  and pension  funds  - have been capturing
most long-term  savings  14.  The pattern and depth of the financial  system  were inherited from the
pre-independence  period and have remained  intact because  the system  itself  has been successful  in
precluding  the development  of an informal  credit sector. Three elements  have cooperated to this
success: a) a strict regulatory  framework  that has prevented  destabilizing  speculation;  b) relatively
conservative  monetary  and exchange  rate policies;  and c) a high confidence  in public  debt due to
strict servicing.
For the purpose of this paper, it is most important  to describe  the functioning  of the system.
In this sense, two aspects are crucial: the determination  of interest rates and the regulation  of
financial  activities.  With respect to the first aspect,  some  interest rates are free but tend to follow
controlled  rates.  Both types of rates have shown  remarkable  stability,  with the exception  of a big
upward  jump in the early 1980s,  lagging  a clear upsurge  in inflation. As a result of such  stability,  real
interest rates have fluctuated much more, reflecting  the greater variability  of inflation  rates (see
Figure 5.1),  but showing  negative  or low  positive  values  for the entire 1980s. As explained  above,
our hypothesis'  contends  that these negative  or low real  interest rates are basically  the result of the
constraints  on private  consumption (and thus on savings  deposited  in financial  markets)  and private
investment  (and thus  on credit  demand)  imposed  by the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism.  But
there are also some  other factors  that help explain  this feature. In particular,  the many  regulations
designed  to channel  financial  resources  to the public  sector, like prescnbed  asset ratios for both
" 4According  to information  reported in Chhibber  et al. (1989),  the size of the insurance
companies  assets relative  to GDP are roughly  the same as Australia's.
'Which is not original  in many  respects,  since  it can be found in Chhiber  et al. (1989)  and
World Bank (1987).FIGURE  5.1
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institutional  investors  "  and the POSB.  On top of this, Chhibber  et al. (1989) argue that the
monetary  authority  manages  required reserve  ratios  in order to contribute  to the overall  stability  of
nominal  interest rates whenever  there is the perception  that net credit demand - speciallly  by the
private  sector -is being  inconsistent  with that  stability.  In spite  of this  management,  real interest  rates
have been showing  a consistent,  albeit slight,  upward  trend during  the eighties.
Regulations of  financial institutions play also a  very important role in  limiting the
substitutability  among  financial  assets  and its relation  to public  sector deficit  financing.  Indeed,  the
public sector has a sort of captive  source of funds in the institutional  investors  which, in tui,  n,
specialize  in medium  to long  term saving  and whose  depositors  are compelled  to save  some  minimum
proportions  of their incomes  in these institutions.  In practice,  much  of the central  government  deficit
has been financed  through this form of forced saving.  What is left after forced savin-, is mainly
distributed  between  deposits  within  the monetary  sector  of the economy,  on one side, and the POSB
and building  societies,  on the other side 17  A smaller  portion of private saving  is devoted to the
direct acquisition  of treasury  blls and government  stocks  and bonds.
5.1 The Model Structure  and Estimation  Results
The model  starts with a specification  of the consolidated  government  budget constraint,  as
found in Easterly  (1989),  and similar  to equation  (4.1)  of the preceding  section:
1660o of institutional  investor  assets  are required to be held in the form  of public  sector
liabilities.
"Other non-monetary  institutions,  like finance  houses,  are of lesser  importance.- 41 -
(5.1)  EC! (Fgc  - Rbt)  +  igt-  [Bzt-.+L&t- 5 +  Apt-1]  +  t=
Et  (DFgt  - DRbt)  +  He  +  Bst  +  L8t  +  Lpt  Ht-l
B,rt_l.-  Lac- l  - L,Pt-1
where Br is public  sector bonds in private  sector hands,  L, represents  govemment  stock and bonds
plus treasury  bills  in the bankdng  system,  G is the government's  primary  deficit,  E is the exchange
rate, i' is the world interest rate, F. is the government's  foreign debt, R.  are foreign exchange
reserves,  H is base money  and Lp  is the stock of captive  loans from institutional  investors  to the
public  sector.  D is the difference  operator. It is assumed  that all public  sector debt pays  the same
interest rate, i8. This is not a strong assumption  since,  as we said before, most interest rates move
closely  together.
Note that this  definition  of the government  budget  constraint  includes  the possibility  of using
base money  issuance  as a source of funding,  but it does not include  debt of parastatals  and local
governments  due to lack  of complete  quarterly  information.  This could  be an important  omission  if
the public  sector  deficit  moves  differently  than the government  budget  deficit but this  is not the case
during  the 19SOL
The government  budget  constraint  could be simplified  because:  a) roughly  the government
can take command  of most resources  deposited  in institutional  investors  and, in turn, people are
forced to save a portion  of their incomes  at such financial  institutions;  thus, it is of less  interest for
our purposes in this section  u;  and b) Zimbabwe  has no access  to voluntary  foreign  lending,  thus
changes in the foreign debt position are basically  determined  by what foreign multilateral  and
government  institutions  decide  to lend to Zimbabwe.
"Although  it is a decisive  factor in explaining  the actual  financing  of the government  budget
deficiL-42  -
This would  imply:
(5.2)  G,  =  A, +  G, - DLp, + iO  lL;,.I,
where A, =  E,[(i*F,t.  - Rb,,,)  - (DFs  .. DRb,)].  That is, we aggregate in a single term, a,  both the
primary  deficit  G and the change  in foreign  debt plus the change  in the public  debt with institutional
investors.
Taking lower case letters to represent nominal  variables  deflated by the price index and
solving  for real base money,  we obtain:
(5.3)  h, = g;-  bft-  1. +  (1  + x 1
t (  [zt.,
where zt., = h,., + (1 + ig. 1)(b,. 1 + 1..) and where x, is the inflation rate between t-I and t.
The non-financial  private  sector  holds  (voluntarily)  three broad  assets:  money,  interest-earning
deposits  in the banking  system,  and public  sector  bonds. Domestic  residents  are neither allowed  to
hold foreign  assets  nor foreign  liabilities,  a prohibition  which  seems  to be effective.  Private  bank loans
to the private  sector are netted from the demand  for interest-eaning deposits.  These demands  are
supposed  to behave  according  to the following  portfolio  equations':
(5.4)  (MI/Pr  =  md = m(i",i,(NFAIP));  m 1,m 2 <  0,  M3  >  0
(5.5)  (OD/P)dr  o  od(ii,,(NFA/P));  od,,od 3 >  0, od 2 < 0
19Tbe  expected  signs  fo the partial derivatives  are denoted behind  each equation.43 -
(5.6)  (B,lP)d  =  brd = (NFA/P) - (Lp/P)  - (MI/P) - (OD/P)
-- nfa - lp - md  od = nfa'-  md  odd
where  NFA is the value  of the private  sector's  net financial  asset holdings  or net wealth,  inclusive  of
compulsory  savings  in the pension funds and insurance  companies,  L.  OD are interest-earning
deposits  at the banking  system  by the latter to the private  non-financial  sector;  they  earn an interest
rate of i,. Total demand  for public  sector debt net of the resources  obtained  from pension  funds  is:
(5.7)  bt 8 =  1d +  b  d,
where 1d  results from the banking  system  balance  sheet, as can be seen in Chart 5.1; that is:
(5-8)  1  = od (,,  ) +  (1-u)(1-c) md(,,  ),
where  u is the banks' reserve  requirement  ratio and c is the preference  for currency.  Note that the
term (1-u)(1-c)  is equal to (s-1)/s,  with  s being  the simple  money  multiplier.  In other words,  the non-
financial  private sector holds OD as an indirect  way to demand public sector debt, through the
financial  system. This leads to the following  total demand for government  debt, after substituting
(5.6) and (5.8) into equation (5.7):
(5.7')  bd = nfa' - (11s)  md(i,infa)
This way,  the central behavioral  piece  ends up being the demand for money,  which  is what
is estimated  in the next  sub-section.  But  before doing  so,  it is necessary  to take into account  what  was
said  above  about the functioning  of financial  markets  and, in particular,  the determination  of interest-44  -
rates. In the first place. both nominal  interest rates in eq. (5.7') are closely  linked.  Indced. if we
assume  zero profits  in the banking  system,  it turns out that:
(5.9)  ic, =  (1-u)i,
Second,  in spite of the fact that real interest rates follow  closely  the path of effective  inflation
because  nominal  interest rates are fairly  stable,  Figure  5.1 in the previous  sub-section  also indicates
an upward trend in those real interest rates. So, in the setting of the nominal  interest rates, the
authority,  in trying  to avoid  an excess  demand  for credit,  has managed  a slow  increase  in real interest
rates  -which  should  be related  to the building  up of public  sector debt -although  they  still  remained
low  as of the third quarter of 1988P.
These two considerations  induced  us to postulate  a demand  for money  of the form:
(5.10) md =  m(r,, ,r.l,  nfa),
where r, is the real interest rate corresponding  to i  and M+, is the expected inflation  to prevail
between t and t+1.
Since  we have in the end just two  financial  markets,  one for money  and the other for public
sector bonds,  equilibrium  in one of them should  suffice  to determine  either the real interest rate or
the expected  inflation  rate. We opt for concentrating  on the determination  of the real interest  rate,
while  assuming  that the expected  inflation  rate is linked  to the effective  inflation  rate, which  in tun,
is related to the real sector of the economy.  Indeed,  we pose the following  stochastic  equstion for
inflation:
aThis does not contradict,  in principle,  our assertion  that real interest rates are low  and even
negative  during the 1980s  as a result of quantitative  constraints  on private consumption  and
private inestment.. 45 -
(5.11)  X = X (dH,  dE, dW)+f,  X  ,  a 
where  f  is a zero mean,  constant  variance  random  shock,  W is average  wages,  and the operator "d"
accounts  for percentage  variation. This inflation  function could be thought  of as a reduced-form
equilibrium  equation for the goods  market.
In addition,  inflationary  expectations  are assumed  to be rational,  such that 21:
(5.12)  M  = EX{ X (,,  )/aU  available  information}.
where  EX denotes  expected  value.
The model  is comprised  by three equations:  (5.11) and (5.12) determine  the effective  and
the expected  inflation  rates, and (5.10)  with m' equating  the supply  of money,  determines  the real
interest rate. To this system,  we could add equation  (53), the government  budget  constraint,  if we
want to endogenize  the behavior  of the money  supply. This would  help in determining  the effects
of changes  in the government  deficit and the corresponding  financing  decisions  on the real interest
rate and inflation.
As an alternative  to the money  market  equilibrium  condition  for determining  the real  interest
rate, one can use the equiibrium  condition  in the public  sector bonds market,  which  also depends
on the demand for money.  That is:
(5.13) b = b  nfl' - (ls)  m(r, M.,, nfa)
2'In  the next subsection, when the model  is estimated,  an alternative  assumption  of adaptive
expectations  is also  considered.- 46  -
CHART 5.1
BALANCE SHEETS OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR
AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR  FINANCIAL SECTOR
M,il  NFA  LS  OD
OD  R (=  uDD)  DD
B,
where R is the banks'  reserves at the Reserve Bank, and DD  is demand deposits at the banking





where s is the simple monetary multiplier.*  47 -
This equation,  plus the government  budget  constraint  in eq. (5.3),  enables  to detcrmine  thc
amount  of budget  deficit financing  that does not resort to monetary  financing.
As said above, the central behavioral  equation in our setup is the demand for money.  We
estimate an implicit  log-linear  adjustment  cost-version  of equation (5.10),  which  is:
(5.14)  In md,  = bo + b, r, + b2e, 1 ,  + b3In nfa, + b4In m. 1 + v,
where b,, ,b2 s  0 and b3, b4 x  0 . The term v, is a assumed  to be a zero mean,  constant  variance
random  residual.  The real interest rate is defined,  in turn, as the nominal  interest rate less  expected
inflation.  In the reported results  we do not restrict b, to equate b2,  although  this was tried. It turns
out, however,  that both estimates  are close  but not to the extent to reject the hypothesis  that they
are significantly  different  to each other.'
Estimating  equation (5.11) for inflation allows to  obtain values for expected inflation
according  to the rational  expectations  hypothesis.  We estimate a linear  version  of equation (5.11)
where  inflation  and the percentage  variation  of H, W and E are measured  in annual  terms,  in order
to be consistent  with the estimated  demand  for money.'
2Some aspects  concerning  the data series  follow. First,  the money  series  is seasonally
adjusted  MI; second,  the nominal  interest rate is a weighted  average  of the public  sector  stock
and bonds  annual interest rates and deposit  rates at commercial  banks,  also on an annual  basis;
and third, net financial  assets (nfa) is a constructed  series  following  equation  (5.6). AU  series  are
deflated by the consumer  price index  of the rich,  which  is less  affected  by  - at some  times
pervasive  - price controls  than the CPI of the poor during  the sample  period.  The same CPI of
the rich is utilized  to calculate  the inflation  rate and, indirectly,  the (annualized)  expected
inflation  rate as welL
23The  data frequency  is quarterly  and the sample  period is 1979,1  to 1988,3  in most
estimations.  The choice of the sample  period obeys  strictly  to the availability  of data..48-
The best results for both equations  are shown  in Table  5.1.  The regressions  were run using
OLS  and Cochrane-Orcutt  procedures  whenever  necessary 2'. As  can be seen, the demand  for moncy
exhibits semi-elasticities  with respect to  the  real interest rate and the  inflation rate that are
significantly  different  from zero and similar  to each other, as expected.  The long-run  values  of such
semi-elasticities  are -4.55  in the case of the real interest rate, and -3.65 in the case of expected
inflation.  The elasticity  with respect  to private  net financial  assets is also significantly  different  from
zero and its point values  are 0.26 in the short run and 0.84 in the long run. The goodness  of fit is
reasonable  and no sign of autocorrelation  is visible  u.
The results  reported for the inflation  rate equation  only  include  as independent  variables  the
one-quarter  lagged  percentage  variations  of base money  and  the exchange  rate (plus the one quarter
lagged  inflation  rate itself).  Coefficients  of other variables  in equation (5.11),  like  wages,  proved  to
be not significantly  different  from zero. To some  extent, in the case  of the latter variable  this could
be attributed  to data problems. In any case,  it seems  that there is a strong  inertia as evidenced  by
the high  value reached  by the one quarter lagged  inflation  rate. This  result  was also  confirmed  by the
inspection  of the autocorrelation  and partial autocorrelation  functions  (not reported here), which
tended to indicate results  close to a martingale  for x.
5.2 Simulation  Results for Alternative  Deficit  Financing  Forms
Based  on the results in Table 5.1,  we can perform  simulations  of the effects  of government
policies,  specialty  those concerning  the size and financing  of the 15scal  deficit.  To proceed,  we first
"Ibe results shown  do not include  this type  of adjustment.
25Judged  on the basis  of a visual  inspection  of residuals,  since  the DW statistic  could be biased
due to the presence  of lagged  real balances  as an independent  variable.-49-
note that the point estimates  of the money  demand  allow  us to obtain an expression  for thc real
interest rate (by inverting  the demand for money),  which  is the following:
(5.15)  r, = -0.71 In m, + 0.18 In nfa, -0.80 x',  + 0.49 In mn.,  - 0.71 f,.
Also,  for convenience,  let's restate the estimated  inflation  equation:
(5.16) x,  = 0.128  dH.l + 0.092  dE,. 1 + 0.723  xtt  + v,
Equations (5.15)  and (5.16),  plus the government  budget constraint in eq. (5.3) and the
assumption  of rational  expectations,  form the basis  of the simulations  below.  Note that the effect  of
policies  like increases  in the money  supply  are not restricted  to single  elasticities  as several  indirect
effects  and feedbacks  are present.  For instance,  the sensitivity  of the real interest rate with respect
to changes  in real money  is such that a one percent increase  in the latter variable  at time t causes
a reduction  in the real interest rate of 0.7 percentage  points  and then an increase  of 0.49  percentage
points in t+1, ceteris panbus. However,  if changes  in m  originate  in changes  in base money,  there
are several  other indirect  effects,  like  the effect  of the change  in base money  on inflation  in t+1 (see
equation (5.16))  and changes  in the real value of private  net financial  assets,  that will modify  the
effect,  specially  starting in period t+1.
The simulation  exercises  that follow  will  begin  with increases  in our modified  primary  deficit
variable,  G', which are financed  in alternative  ways.  Later we discuss  the implications  of a purely
monetary  policy  of altering  reserve  requirement  ratios without  changing  the monetary  base.-so.
a)  Effects  of a 10% Primary  Deficit  Increase  Financed  by Base Money  Creation
This experiment  assumes  a 10% increase  in 0'  at t and then no further changes  in such
variable  - that is, G',,, = 0, s >  0.  The increase  in the primary  deficit is financed  by base money
creation,  that is, dH, >  0. According  to the relative  magrnitudes  of G' and H, a 10%  increase  in G,
requires  a 2.83%  increase  in H,.  Since  there are no further increments  in G', dH,+,  = 0, s >  0. Also,
very importantly,  we make the assumption  that the nominal  interest rates remained  fixed  all along
the experiment.
The results of this simulation  are reported in Table 5.2a, where we have taken - just for
illustration  purposes - 1990.1  as period 1, initiating  a simulation  horizon  of 16 quarters. Also, it is
assumed  that at time 0, before the change in G' occurs, the system  is at a state of rest, with all
changes  in variables  set to zero. The level of the real interest rate and the iiflation rate are also
supposed  to be zero initially. Figure 5.2 shows  the evolution  of the latter two variables  after the
increase  in G' financed  by an increase  in H. As it is clear from  both the table and the figure,  there
is at first  a significant  decline  in real interest rates, as the increase  in base money  brings  an increase
in real money  balances  since inflation  is not affected  until the t+1 quarter (1990.2).  The positive
lagged  effect  of real balances  on the real interest rate brings  the latter back to a level  closer to its
initial  value of zero in 1990.2.  This effect  is offset,  however,  by the upward  jump in the inflation  rate
in that quarter. Afterwards,  the  persistence of a  positive inflation rate will dominate in  the
determination  of the real interest rate, in spite that the same  positive  inflation  implies  reductions  in
real balances  and in nfa that will put an upward  pressure  on r. In the end, the price level  went up
by a cumulative  1.31%,  about half of the initial  increase  in base money.  The final  effect on the real
interest rate is a 1.3 percentage point reduction,  while,  by assumption,  the nominal  interest rate
remains  unchanged.-51  -
b)  Effects  of a 10%g  Primary  Deficit  Increase  financed  by Debt.  with Future Payments  paid  by
Base Money  Creation
In this simulation,  the government  does not resort to money  creation, but to new debt
creation  to finance  the increased  deficit  at t; however,  it issues  base money  beginning  in t+1 in order
to pay  for the interest payments  generated  by the new  debt issued  at t. All  basic  assumptions  remain
the same as in the previous  simulation.
The new  debt issued  at t has a significant  positive  impact  on the real interest rate during  that
period,  1990.1,  while  no effect  on inflation  is detected since  no change  in base money  has occurred.
This  situation  changes  starting  in t+1 (1990.2),  when the government  decides  to pay for the interest
payments  generated  by the new debt issued  at t by resorting  to base money  creation. This brings  a
gradual reduction in the real interest rate due to the forces at work in the previous  simulation.
Simultaneously,  the increases  in base money also result in a positive inflation rate from 1990.3
onwards. These paths and numbers  are reflected  by Table 5.2b and Figure 5.3.
We also include  in this experiment  the assumption  that the principal  of the new  debt issued
at time t (1990.1)  is paid back in full after 15 quarters, in 1993.3,  again by resorting  to base money
creation. This,  as expected,  provokes  a big downward  jump in the real interest  rate at the time,  and
an upward  jump in the inflation  rate in the following  quarter, 1993.4.  Although  one can imagine
government  debt to stay at its increased  level for a long time,  while  interest payments  are financed
through  base money  creation,  it implies  an unsustainable  path of positive,  slightly  increasing  inflation
rates. Then, at some point in time,  it will  be convenient  to pay  back the debt and assume  a higher
but decreasing  inflation  rate. All  in all, under these assumptions,  the debt financing  strategy  ends up
being  more inflationary  after 16 quarters (1.88%  of cumulative  inflation)  than the alternative  of
financing  the increased  deficit at t by directly  resorting  to base money  creation  in the same period.- 52  -
TABLE  5.1
Estimation  Results for the Demand  for Money  and Inflation  (1980-1988)
Equation (5.14): Demand  for Money
Variable  Coefficients  Estimates  T value
Constant  bO  -0.18  0.56
Real interest rate  bl  -1.41  -2.76
Expected  inflation  b2  -1.13  -2.33
Net financial  assets  b3  0.26  2.37
Lagged  m (1 quarter)  W  0.69  7.27
RR = 0.868; Adjusted Ri  = 0.850; F-Statistic = 47.653; DW =  1.84.
Equation (5.11):  Inflation  Rate
Variable  Lags  Coefficient  Estimates  T value
Constant  0  aO  -0.003  -0.18
Base Money  Growth  1  al  0.128  4.02
Nom.Exch.  Rate Grwoth  1  a2  0.092  3.09
Lagged  Inflation  rate  1  a3  0.723  7.39
R2 = 0.757; Adjusted R2 = 0.732; F-Statistic = 35.32; Q = 23.46.- 53  -
TABLE  5.2
SIKULATION  OF EFFECTS  OF DIFFERENT  BUDGET  FINANCING  POLICIES
A. EFFECTS  OF A 10%  INCREASE  IN G'  (t) FINANCED  WITH  BASE  MONEY  CREATION  IN t.
YEAR  dG'  dH  dB  PI  dm  dnfa  Dr  r  db(d)
1990.1  10  2.83  0  0.0  2.8300  0.8094  -1.8636  -1.8636  -0.6524
1990.2  0  0  0  0.3679  -0.3679  -0.1052  -1.3346  -0.5290  0.4479
1990.3  0  0  0  0.2649  -0.2649  -0.0758  -0.2177  -0.7467  -0.0731
1990.4  0  0  0  0.1907  -0.1907  -0.0545  -0.1568  -0.9035  -0.0526
1991.1  0  0  0  0.1373  -0.1373  -0.0393  -0.1129  -1.0164  -0.0379
1991.2  0  0  0  0.0989  -0.0989  -0.0283  -0.0813  -1.0976  -0.0273
1991.3  0  0  0  0.0712  -0.0712  -0.0204  -0.0585  -1.1562  -0.0196
1991.4  0  0  0  0.0513  -0.0513  -0.0147  -0.0421  -1.1983  -0.0141
1992.1  0  0  0  0.0369  -0.0369  -0.0106  -0.0303  -1.2286  -0.0102
1992.2  0  0  0  0.0266  -0.0266  -0.0076  -0.0218  -1.2505  -0.0073
1992.3  0  0  0  0.0191  -0.0191  -0.0055  -0.0157  -1.2662  -0.0053
1992.4  0  0  0  0.0138  -0.0138  -0.0039  -0.0113  -1.2775  -0.0038
1993.1  0  0  0  0.0099  -0.0099  -0.0028  -O.0082  -1.2857  -0.0027
1993.2  0  0  0  0.0071  -0.0071  -0.0020  -0.0059  -1.2915  -0.0020
1993.3  0  0  0  0.0051  -0.0051  -0.0015  -0.0042  -1.2958  -0.0014
1993.4  0  0  0  0.0037  -0.0037  -0.0011  -0.0030  -1.2968  -0.0010
B. EFFECTS  OF A  10% INCREASE  IN G'  (t) FINANCED  WITH  DEBT  IN t.
INTEREST  PAYMENTS  STARTING  IN  t+l ARE  PAID FOR WITH  BASE  MONEY  CREATION
YEAR  dG'  dH  dB  PI  dm  dnfa  Dr  r  db(d)
1990.1  10  0.0000  1.300  0.0  0.0000  0.6637  0.6221  0.6221  0.2088
1990.2  0  0.2819  0.000  0.0000  0.2819  0.0806  -0.1856  0.4365  -0.0623
1990.3  0  0.2819  0.000  0.0366  0.2453  0.0701  -0.0527  0.3838  -0.0177
1990.4  0  0.2819  0.000  0.0630  0.2189  0.0626  -0.0744  0.3094  -0.0250
1991.1  0  0.2819  0.000  0.0820  0.1999  0.0572  -0.0900  0.2194  -0.0302
1991.2  0  0.2819  0.000  0.0957  0.1862  0.0533  -0.1012  0.1182  -0.0340
1991.3  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1056  0.1763  0.0504  -0.1093  0.0088  -0.0367
1991.4  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1127  0.1693  0.0486  -0.1152  -0.1063  -0.0387
1392.1  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1178  0.1641  0.0469  -0.1194  -0.2257  -0.0401
1992.2  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1214  0.1605  0.0459  -0.1224  -0.3481  -0.0411
1992.3  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1241  0.1578  0.0451  -0.1246  -0.4727  -0.0418
1992.4  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1260  0.1559  0.0446  -0.1261  -0.5968  -0.0423
1993.1  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1274  0.1545  0.0442  -0.1273  -0.7261  -0.0427
1993.2  0  0.2819  0.000  0.1283  0.1536  0.0439  -0.1281  -0.8541  -0.0430
1993.3  0  3.1119  -1.300  0.1291  2.9828  0.8531  -1.9923  -2.8464  -0.6686
1993.4  0  0.0000  0.000  0.4975  -0.4975  -0.1423  1.3912  -1.4552  0.4669- 54  -
TABLE  5.2  (Cont.)
C. EFFECTS  OF A 10%  INCREASE  IN G'(t)  FINANCED  WITH  DEBT  IN t.
INTEREST  PAYMENTS  STARTING  IN t+1 ARE  PAID FOR WITH  NEW  BOND
ISSUES  UNTIL  1993.3,  WHEN  THE  INITIAL  DEBT  IS REPAID  WITH
BASE MONEY  CREATION.
YEAR  dG'  dH  dB  PI  dm  dnfa  Dr  r  db(d)
1990.1  10  0.000  1.30  0.0000  0.0000  0.6637  0.6221  0.6221  0.2088
1990.2  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.6843  0.0209
1990.3  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.7465  0.0209
1990.4  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.8087  0.0209
1991.1  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.8709  0.0209
1991.2  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.9332  0.0209
1991.3  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  0.9954  0.0209
1991.4  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.0576  0.0209
1992.1  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.1198  0.0209
1992.2  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.1820  0.0209
1992.3  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  C.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.2442,  0.0209
1992.4  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.3064  0.0209
1993.1  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.3686  0.0209
1993.2  0  0.000  0.13  0.0000  0.0000  0.0664  0.0622  1.4308  0.0209
1993.3  0  6.495 -2.99  0.0000  6.4948  0.3311  -4.5517 -3.1208  -1.5275
1993.4  0  0.000  0.00  0.8443  -0.8443  -0.2415  3.0630  -0.0579  1.0279
Definitions:
dG' : Percent Change in G'
dH  :  Percent Change in H
dB  : Percent  Change  in B
Pi  : Inflation Rate
dM  : Percent Change in Real Base Money, h
dnfa  : Percent Change in Real Private Net Financial Assets, nfa
Dr  :  Change in Real Interest Rate
r  : Level of  the Real Interest Rate
db(d)  :  Percent Change in  the  Demand for  Government BondsFIGURE  5.2
EFFECTS  ON R AND PI, SIMULATION  A.
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C)  EEfects  of a 10%  Primary  Deficit  Increase  financed  by Debt with Interest Payments  rinanced
by further Debt until 1993.3.  when  Total Debt is repaid  by Base Money  Creation
This time,  the government  pays  the interests of the new debt with further new debt 1, and
again it rescues  the total cumulative  debt 15  quarters later by creating  base money.  As can be seen
in Table  5.2c  and Figure  5A,  while  the stock  of debt is  increasing,  the real interest rate also goes  up,
and the price level  is not affected  since  no change  in base money  takes place. This state of matters
is strongly  altered  when  total government  debt is paid  back. In 1993.3,  a drastic  reduction  in the real
interest rate occurs,  followed  by an increase  in the inflation  rate the next  quarter. Afterwards,  both
variables  follow  the path in the first simulation.  The difference  lies, however,  in the magnitude  of
the changes. In effect, the increase  in base money  should  be sufficiently  large as to pay back the
accumulated  debt, and this fact brings  such a drastic increase  in inflation,  then in just three more
quarters (1994.3),  accumulated  inflation  in this exercise  exceeds  that in the two previous  exercises.
All in all, in spite cf their simplicity,  the reported simulation  exercises  are useful on two
accounts.  On one hand,  they  show  the dynamic  sensitivity  of our two  main  endogenous  variables,  the
real interest  rate and the inflation  rate, with  respect  to government  budget  deficit  financing  decisions
and to the decision  to increase  such a deficit  in the first  place.  In this sense,  it is clear that positive
inflation  rates result in all cases,  but cumulative  inflation  after several  quarters never matches  the
increase  in base money  that follows  the increment  in G'. This results from not including  similar
increases  in the nominal exchange rate rather than from non-neutrality  features."  We run a
simulation  for case (a) but adding  a devaluation  of 2.83%  in 1990.1  and distinguishing  between an
2'Since  the changes  in B to pay the interest obligations  are low,  no account  is taken of the
compounded  effect on the total debt.
2 "Indeed, the empirical  estimates  of the coefficients  of the inflation  equation "almost"  add
up to one. Moreover,  when eq. (5.11)  is estimated  with the price homogeneity-of-degree-one
restriction  that the sum of these estimates  is equal to one, results  do not change by much in terms
of inflation.-57  -
almost  - neutral case (the one presented above) and a fully  neutral case, in which the estimated
coefficients  of eq. (5.11)  are constrained  to add up to one. The comparison  between  these two  cases
is presented  in Figure  5.5,  for expected  inflation  and the real interest rate.
Real interest rates, meanwhile,  follow  very different  patterns  which  crucially  depend on the
way  the government  finances  its increased  deficit  and the assumption  of fixed  nominal  interes. rates.
In a similar  aspect,  the simulations  are also a nice iMustration  of the prevalence  of Sargent
and Wallace's  (1981)  'unpleasant  monetarist  arithmetic, as debt financing  of government  deficits  in
Zimbabwe  would only be postponing  inflationary  pressures.  Of course, this is true as long as
government  debt can not be increased  beyond some point in time. Tbe issue is then when this
TM saturation"  point is  achieved;  the answer  will  depend  on both macroeconomic  conditions  (that is, the
extent to which  private consumption  and private  investment  can continue  to be restricted)  and, to
a lesser  degree,  the conditions  in financial  markets.  We have  found that changes  in dericit  financing
decisions  have some effects  on real interest rates that could  destabilize  financial  markets,  specially
if nominal  interest rates are fixed  for long periods  of time, as assumed  here.
Fmally,  the implications  of a purely  monetary  policy  that is effected  through,  say,  the required
reserve  ratio, should be equivalent  to those of an increase  in base money  whose proceedings  are
accumulated  as profits  (losses)  of the Reserve  Bank As  such,  they  would  impinge  on the government
budget  constraint  sooner or later.FIGURE  5.3
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6.  CROWDING  OUT OF PRIVATE  CONSUMPTION  AND PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
This  section  goes a step further  in analyzing  the macroeconomic  implications  of public  sector
deficits  by analyzing  the impact  of the public  sector  on private  sector spending. Hence the focus is
on the sensitivity  of private consumption  and investment  to fiscal  variables,  in addition  to indirect
effects  of them via interest rates, inflation  or private  disposable  income  How private saving  and
capital formation are affected by fiscal policies  has significant  implications  for both short-term
stabilization  issues  and long-run  growth  prospects.
Table 6.1 presents  data on the 1980/81  - 1988/89  sectoral  saving  and investment  record of
Zimbabwe.2  Between 1982/83  and 1987/88  a major external  adjustment  took place, implying  a 10
percentage  point (of GDP) reduction  in the current account  deficit,  achieving  slight  surpluses  in the
last two  years. This improvement  in external  accounts  relied  exclusively  on the private  sector. while
up to 1986/87  the non-financial  public  sector deficit  hovered  around 14% of GDP, t In fact, during
the latter fiscal  year,  when the public  deficit  reached  again its previous  reord  14.4%,  100%  of that
deficit  was financed  by the private sector. As discussed  in section 4 above, a partial public  sector
adjustment  took place  starting  in 1987/88,  implying  a reduction  of 3.5  percentage  points  in the deficit
and an additional  0.9 percentage  point  decline  in 1988/89.  Ihe private  sector  benefitted  directly  from
this decline,  with a similar  reduction  in its required  surplus.
Let's focus  now  on the evolution  of the components  of private  and public  deficits. Figure  6.1
shows  foreign,  private  and public  saving  ratios  and Figure  6.2 presents  private  and public  investment
ratios during  the 1980s
WIne  fiscal-year  macroeconomic  aggregates  of table 6,1 (foreign  saving,  national  saving,  gross
domestic  instment  and GDP) are consistent  with calendar-year  data from national  accounts.
Non financial  public  sector (central  government  and public  enterpris  and local authorities)
saving  and investment  figure are from tables 2.2 and 2.5.- 62  -
TABLE  6.1
ZIMBABWE
PU3LIC  AND PRIVATE SECTOR  SAVING  AND INVESTMENT
80-81  81-82  82-83  83-84  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-8S  88-89
:  CURR_lNT-PRICE  INVESTMENT  AND SAVING  (ZS  mill.)
F*reign  Saving  270.8  451.8  440.8  293.1  166.2  91.1  1.7  -45.8  -30.8
Gross  Nat  Saving  544.6  611.1  610.0  810.4  1173.8  1453.5  1658.1  2026.5  2544.1
Cer.tral  Governcmn -186.4  -89.9  -55.1  -279.8  -306.6  -386.1  -575.6  -155.6  -170.4
Publ  Ent  and LA  30.6  -45  -92.8  51.3  105.3  152.3  242.1  157.5  132
NF Public  Sector  -155.8  -134.9  -147.9  -228.5  -201.3  -233.8  -333.5  1.9  -38.4
Private  Sector  700.4  746.0  757.9  1038.9  1375.1  1687.3  1991.6  2024.6  2582.5
Gross  Dom Investm.  815.4  1062.8  1050.9  1103.5  1340.0  1544.5  1659.8  1980.7  2513.3
Central  Governme.n  65.1  122.2  191.9  208.7  203.2  221.2  293.1  485  523
PLbl  Ent  and  LA  136.2  394.2  412  479.6  447.2  643.5  615.3  587.4  600
NF Public  Sector  201.3  516.4  603.9  688.3  650.4  864.7  908.4  1072.4  1123
Prlvate  Sector  614.1  546.4  447.0  415.2  689.6  679.8  751.4  908.3  1390.3
NF Public  S DefLect  357.1  651.3  751.8  916.8  851.7  1098.5  1241.9  1070.5  1161.4
Private  S  Deficit  -86.3  -199.5  -311.0  -623.7  -685.5 -1007.4 -1240.2 -1116.3 -1192.2
----.--------- _-----------_--------_------------_-----_-__--____-..---_---.--__-----.---------------
2.  I!VESTMENT  AND SAVING  RATIOS (To  GDP)
Forelgn  Saving  0.069  0.094  0.077  0.046  0.025  0.012  0.000  -0.005  -0.003
Gross  Nat Saving  0.139  0.127  0.106  0.128  0.175  0.190  0.193  0.207  0.219
Central  Governmn  -0.048  -0.019  -0.010  -0.044  -0.046  -0.050  -0.067  -0.016  -0.015
Publ  Ent  and  LA  0.008  -0.009  -0.016  0.008  0.016  0.020  0.028  0.016  0.011
NF Publte  Sector  -0.040  -0.028  -0.026  -0.036  -0.030  -0.031  -0.039  0.000  -0.003
Private  Sector  0.179  0.155  0.132  0.163  0.205  0.220  0.231  0.207  0.223
Cross  Dom Investm.  0.209  0.221  0.183  0.174  0.200  0.202  0.193  0.202  0.217
Central  Governmen  0.017  0.025  0.033  0.033  0.030  0.029  0.034  0.050  0.045
Publ  Ent and  LA  0.035  0.082  0.072  0.075  0.067  0.084  0.071  0.060  0.052
NF PubLie  Sector  0.052  0.107  0.105  0.108  0.097  0.113  0.105  0.110  0.097
Private  Sector  0.157  0.113  0.078  0.065  0.103  0.089  0.08?  0.093  0.120
NF PubLic  S  Deficit  0.091  0.135  0.131  0.144  0.127  0.143  0.144  0.109  0.100
Private  S Deficit  -0.022  -0.041  -0.054  -0.098  -0.102  -0.132  -0.144  -0.114  -0.103
-_.  .... _____--..----.  ___________--...-------............._.,,.._________  -...----.....-...-..........-.  __  .--  ____  ..----..  _._  ....- ___._.-.....---____-......---_- 63 -
To generate a surplus  which  financcs  100%  or morc  of the public  dericit since 1986/87.  the
private  sector raised  significantly  its saving  rate: since  1984/85  it exceeds  20% of GDP and financcs
more than 100%  of the economy's  gross  domestic  investment.  This private  saving  rate is cxtremely
high for a developing  economy  - a counterpart of very low private consumption  rates, barely
exceeding  50% of GDP during  the last 5 years. High private  saving  channeled  through  Zimbabwe's
developed financial  system to  the public sector, is probably a result of restrictions  on  private
consumption  (particularly  imported  consumer  durables)  and on formal  or illegal  capital  outflows,
coupled  to a perception  by the private  sector  that the domestic  financial  system  is  stable. However,
some  of these conditions  might change,  particularly  those related to direct consumption  repression
if trade reform  is enacted in the future.
Aggregate  or domestic  gross  investment  has not shown  a strong  Cownward  trend during  the
1980s;  however,  in 1986/87,  when the public deficit reached again its record high, the domestic
investment  rate was a couple  of percentage points  lower than in 1980/81  - 1981/82  when the high
deficits  started.  And conversely,  when fiscal adjustment  took place after 1986/87,  the domestic
investment  rate recovered  by 2.4 percentage  points  of GDP. On the other side, the composition  of
investment  changed significantly  with the fiscal  expansion  of the early 1980s;  in fact, the deficit
increased  approximately  one by  one with the increase  of public  investment,  while  private  investment
fell. With fiscal  adjustment  after 1986/87,  both the absolute  level  and the share  of private  investment
in domestic  capital formation  recovered,  with a more than 3 percentage  points rise in the private
investment  rate, while public  investment  did not suffer  significantly.
The fact that both total investment  and the share of private investment  recover  under  fiscal
adjustment  is a significant  step in the right direction,  as growth  -- which  has been rather modest
throughout  the 1980s  -- is strongly  dependent  on the quantity  and quality  of investment,  the latterFIGURE 6.1
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probably  positively  influenced  by higher private investment  shares.  Hence additional  investmcnt
gains,  particularly  in the private  sector,  could  be positively  influenced  by continued  fiscal  adjustment.
Fiscal  adjustment  should  rely  on additional  gains  in public  saving,  over and above  the increase  of the
public  saving  rate from -3.9%  in 1986/87  to -0.3%  in 1988/89.
6.1. Private  Consumption
This subsection,  significantly  based  on a framework  developed  by  Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1991),  addresses  the effects  of public  policies  on consumption  in Zimbabwe. 2'  Private  consumption
(as a ratio to private  disposable  income)  depends  on neoclassical  determinants  (permanent  income,
interest rates, and relative prices),  Keynesian  variables  and liquidity  constraints  (current income,
consumer  credit  money,  foreign  saving),  public  saving,  inflation,  and  public  spending  on private  goods.
The presence of permanent public  saving reflects two very different hypotheses:  the first is the
Ricardian  equivalence  hypothesis,  which  states that private  consumption  increases  one on one with
an increase in  permanent public saving, while the second asserts that under an institutional
arrangement  by  which  the public  sector  captures  private  saving  either  directly  or through  the domestic
financial  markets,  current private  saving  is crowded  out one by  one by current public  saving. In the
case of Zimbabwe,  we think that the second  interpretation  is much  more valid  than that of rational
forward-looking  private  consumers  who  internalize  the public  sector's  intertemporal  budget  constraint.
2 ' In fact,  Zimbabwe  is one of the 13 countries  which  comprise  the panel sample  for the
consumption  functions  estimated  by Corbo  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991).-67  -
The following  specification  for the private  consumption  to private  disposable  incomc  ratio"
renlects  these variables,  which  in addition  allows  for testing  the simple  Keynesian,  permanent  income
and Ricardian/direct  crowding  out hypotheses: 31
(6.1)  DY'  =  PO +  1 3 p  'Pt  +  2 PSgt  +  P 3
1 c+  e  cPSm
DY~  DY,  DYpccn 'pt  pc  Ocpcnc
+  CP  TR  P7  Ht  7  He  +  SFSE  P  CCe  I
+136  DY  1  7  DY  +P7  - DYo  8  Yt  9DYo  It
DYpt  yp  DY9 Dypt  YP
where DYp  is current private  disposable  income,  PDYp  is permanent  private  disposable  income,  PS,
is permanent public saving, r, is the  consumption-based  real interest rate,  rX is the  private
consumption  deflator  rate of change,  P,. and P,n  are the deflators  for imported  and national  private
consumption  goods,  respectively,  CPTR is the sum of public  expenditure  on privately  appropriated
services  and direct transfers  to consumers, 3'  H is base money,  FS is foreign  saving,  CC is banking
sector credit to consumers,  and v, is a stochastic  error term.
Expected  signs  of the coefficients  are the following:  Ba,  B3,  1 B  137,  as,  B, >  0; 06  < 0; B3,  B4,  15
<>  0.
'All non-stationary  variables  are scaled  to current private  disposable  income  in order to avoid
spurious  correlation. An alternative  procedure,  combining  cointegration  tests and dynamic  error-
correction  models,  is not feasible  due to the short time series.
" 1Three simple  null hypotheses  are tested with this specification:  (i) Keynesian:  43 > 0, B, =
B2  = 0; (ii)  Permanent  income  hypothesis  without  Ricardian  equivalence: B, > 0, So  = 62  =  0;
(iii) Ricardian  equivalence  or direct crowding-out  hypothesis:  Bo  = 0, B1  = 02  >  0.
3tPrivately  appropriated  series  paid by government  are measured  as the sum  of public
expenditure  on education  and health. These, plus direct  transfers  to consumers,  could reduce
private consumption  if they are substitutes  of the latter.-68-
Expected  permanent  private  disposable  income  and permanent  public  saving  are consistent
with the following  definitions  for their corresponding  current values:
(6.2)  DYpn X  GDP, - NFPp,  - T, + r, D,
(6.3)  Sa,  m  T, - CO.  - NFP 0 , - r, D,
where GDP is gross  domestic  product,  NFPp  is net foreign  payments  made  by the private  sector, So
is current public  sav;ng,  CO  is public  consumption,  and NFP,, is net foreign  payments  made by the
public  sector. Note that D refers now  only to the domestic  public  debt.
For the expected permanent  values of any variable (private  disposable  income and public
saving  in this  section,  and  other variables  in the investment  section  below)  we specify  two  alternatives.
The first is partial perfect foresight,  defined  as the simple  average  of the contemporaneous  variable
and two periods  into the future, for any variable  x:
(6.4a) Qxk =  [x, + x,+ +  &.z113
The second  alternative  is the static-exptxctations  specification  which  allocates  a 1009o  weight
to the contemporaneous  value in (6.4a),  as follows:
(6.4b) Ox,  x,
Similar  assumptions  are made  with respect  to expected  consumption  inflation  (and expected
investment  inflation  below). A first alternative  takes actual inflation  between  today and tomorrow
as  the  relevant proxy for retionally expected inflation.  The second alternative is adaptive-69-
expectations,  specifying  the expected  price  change  either from  an ARMA  backward-looking  process
or giving  100%  of the weight  to the actual  price  change  between  yesterday  and today,  consistent  with
ntatic  expectations.
Table  6.2 reports the main  results  of implementing  equation  (6.1)  to Zimbabwe,  using  annual
data for the 1965-1988  period. 33
The complete specification  renders not very satisfactory  results for both expectational
alternatives. Most variables  are not statistically  significant  and two liquidity  constraints  (consumer
credit and base money),  present  opposite,  although  not significant,  signs  to those expected  a priori.
Less  surprising  is the low  significancy  of the inflation  and interest rates,  with  ambiguous  a priori  signs.
As in most other developing  countries (see for instance  the cross-country  studies by Giovannini
(1983),  Corbo  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991),  and  S'hmidt-Hebbel,  Webb  and  Corsetti  (1991)),  the well-
known  substitution  and wealth  effects  seem to offset  each other in Zimbabwe.
A different  proach  was followed  next  by concentrating  on the Keynesian  (current income),
permanent  income  and Ricardian/direct  crowding  out (public  saving)  determinants.  Adding  to these
variables  two  dummies  for the 1987-88  structural  decline  in private  consumption  and the 1984  outlier,
the results  reported under 12 and 2.2 are obtained.
Both the overall fit and the separate significance  of the contributing  variables is more
acceptable  under the static expectations  alternative  for permanent income  and permanent public
saving.
The magnitude  of current income  is surprisingly  high as compared  to permanent income  --
a feature which  is even more  extreme under the partial perfect foresight  specification.  In fact, the
0.61/0.12  relative magnitude  of current/permanent  income  is much higher than the 0.60/0.-4  ratio
'The results including  CPTR are not reported in table 6.2 due to the high positive  sign  of its
coefficient,  which  affects  seriously  signs  and significancy  levels  of other variables.. 70-
obtained for 13 developing  countries  applying  a similar  methodology.' This suggests  that current
income is a  more stringent liquidity  constraint,  effectively  limiting intertemporal  consumption
smoothing.
By contrast,  public  saving  strongly  affects  private  consumption  in Zimbabwe  under the static
expectations  alternative.  The fact that the current public saving alternative (the measure for
permanent  public  saving  under static  expectations)  is significant  while  the three-year  moving  average
of current and future public saving is not (under partial perfect foresight),  confirms  the initial
presumption  that it is direct crowding  out of private saving  by public saving  and not Ricardian
anticipation  of future taxes  which  is behind  this high  value.
The main  conclusion  of our results points  toward  the everwhelming  dominance  of the direct
effects of public  sector deficits (or dissaving)  over other indirect  effects of deficit financing  (via
interest or inflation  rates) on private consumption. A Z$1 increase in the deficit (caused by a
corresponding  rise  in public  consumption)  reduces  private  consumption  by  Z$0.67,  without  significant
additional  effects  of how different  deficit financing  forms  affect interest and inflation  rates.
6.2 Private  Investment
Following  Easterly  et al. (1989)  we specify  a behavioral  function  for private  investment  which
will  depend on neoclassical  profit  and cost variables,  liquidity  constraints  and risk  determinants.  To
avoid  again  spurious  correlation,  we scale all non-stationary  variables  to GDP. Therefore  we specify
the following  generic  equation for the private  investment  to GDP ratio:
'From the panel data results  reported in table 3.2 by Corbo and Scbmidt-Hebbel  (1991).71 -
(6.5)  .it  - _  P,  PCSTr  Kt- 1 PROt  FCC ye  (PUCKt, PMPK,u  p  Liyy 
He  FSe  VTCKC  VY,
Yt,  Yt, 
Iy  I
where  Ip is private  fixed-capital  investment,  Y is GDP, UCK  is the user cost of capital  and PUCK  is
the estimated  permanent  UCK, MPK  is the marginal  product  of capital  (defined  below)  and PMPK
is its permanent estimate,  PpJP,p,  is the price ratio of imported and national private investment
components,  COT is corporate tax revenue  and PCOT  is its permanent  estimate,  K.,  is the lagged-
end-of-per.od  public  sector capital  stock, PRO is corporate profits,  FC is banking  credit flows  to
firms,  H is base money,  FS is foreign  saving,  VUCK  is the coefficient  of variation  of UCK,  and VY
is the coefficient  of variation  of GDP. The expected  signs  of the corresponding  partial derivatives
are denoted below  each variable.
The current real user cost of capital  is defined  as:
(6.6)  UCKt  =  (Pzt/Pt)  1 (ipt - Pt)  (1+Pat)  4  81
where P, is the private  investment  deflator,  ip  is the nominal  interest rate on banking  loans to firms,
P;¢ is the expected rate of change of the private investment  deflator, and 6 is the (real) capital
depreciation  rate.
The marginal  product  of private  sector  capital  is approximated  by the average  product  (the latter
being  a linear  transformation  of the former  under  a Co^bb-Douglas  technology,  for instance),  defined- 72 -
as the ratio between current-period  GDP and the lagged-end-of-period  private  sector capital  stock
(6.7)  MPK,  =  y,,  l
The total capital  stock  (K) satisfies  the adding-up  constraint:
(6.8)  K=K  + Kp
Expected  investment  inflation  witl  be based on an auto-regressive  structure,  while  all expected
permanent variables  wilt be specified  according  to two hypotheses:  the partial perfect foresight
altemative  of equation (6.4a)  and the static  version  of equation  (6.4b).
The two  coefficients  of variation,  which  reflect risk  variables,  are defined  as Eive-period  moving
coefficients,  based  on two periods-back,  the current period,  and two into the future.
A linear form of equation (6.5)  was estimated  for Zimbabwe  using  annual private  investment  to
GDP ratios covering  the 1965-1988  period. The main results  are presented  in table 63.
Some  differences  arise between the initial  structures  of equation (6.5) and the reported results.
In the first place,  better results were obtained when splitting  the user cost of capital into its two
components,  the relative price of investment  goods (PRP)  and the real interest rate relevant for
investment  decisions  net of the rate of depreciation, RPL  ((;ft-'A  (I +PD4) 6)  . For the latter,
as well as for other variables involving estimates of permanent values (the relative price of-73 -
investment  goods, the marginal  product of capital, and corporate tax revenue), only the static
expectations  versions  are reported35.
The results  are very  satisfactory,  as opposed  to the consumption  equations  discussed  above.  Most
neoclassical,  liquidity  constraint,  and uncertainty  variables  present expected signs and are highly
significant.
Just for reference the results for the most general specification  are reported in equation 1.1,
although  there are not many  degrees  of freedom left over. Of all variables  only the corporate tax
revenue to output ratio is significant  and presents  a sign  opposite  to what is expected a priori.  This
variable,  in addition to the firm credit to output ratio and the coefficient  of variation  of GDP, is
deleted from the next results.
The two components  of the user cost of capital are highly  significant.  The magnitude  of their
signs  differ private  investors  in Zimbabwe  react three times  as strong to the real interest rate than
to the relative  price  of investment  goods.  The private  capital  stock  to output ratio (the inverse  of the
current average  product of capital) presents the correct sign but achieves  acceptable  sgnificancy
levels  only  under the maximum  likelihood  estimations  correcting  for residual  first  order correlation
(ML (AR1)).  In addition,  its magnitude  is small  relative  to the real interest rate.
The significant  role of the public  capital stock to output ratio (similar  in magnitude  and
significance  to the private  capital  stock)  suggests  a strong  complementarity  between  public  and private
capital  in Zimbabwe.  This  crowding  in effect  of public  investment  on private  capital  formation  is an
important  result  reflecting  that the composition  of public  expenditure  matters  for the country's  growth
prospects.
'Mhe relative  price of investment  components  is omitted  from the reported results,  due to its
unplausibly  high coefficient  and disturbing  effect  on parameters  related to theoretically  more
important  variables,  probably  due to colinearity  between  the former and the latter.- 74 -
Two flow variables  (firms profits and foreign  lending as reflected  by the current account
deficit)  and one stock  variable  (base money)  are (or proxy)  significant  liquidity  constraints  faced by
private  investors,  which  is not surprising  for a period dominated  by interest rate controls,  which  are
being relaxed  only throughout  the last years.  Even under complete  domestic  financial  liberalization
one should  expect  that borrowing  constraints  would  affect private  capital  formation,  in addition  to
the influence  of totally  liberalized  interest rates.
Finally,  there is only  weak  evidence  for the role of our uncertainty  proxies  in affecting  private
capital  formation.  In the most general  specification  (line 1.1),  the coefficient  of variation  of GDP
affects  negatively  and significantly  private investment.  In lines 1.2 and 1.2A  the influence  of the
coefficients  of variation  of the relative  price of investment  goods (VPIP) and the real interest rate
(VRIL) is negative  though  weak,  not achieving  acceptable  significancy  levels.
The main  conclusions  from our results  with regard to the role of public  sector deficits  and
their structures  in determining  private  investment  in Zimbabwe  are referred to the indirect  effect  of
deficit financing  and the direct effects of taxes and public  expenditure.  Real interest rates have a
strong negative  influence  on private investment  - hence domestic  debt financing  of public  sector
deficits,  which  tends  to push  up interest rates as has been  observed  during  the eighties  in Zimbabwe,
has a significant  crowding  out effect.  Public  investment,  on the other side, has a significant  crowding
in effect (although  probably  of a smaller  magnitude  than the deleterious  effect via interest rates of
domestic  debt financing). For each one-percentage-point  of GDP increase  of public investment
(which  will  raise  the public  capital  stock  to GDP ratio  by a similar  amount),  private  investment  could
rise by 0.15 - 0.25 percentage points of GDP.TABLE  6.2
PRXWVAk  0tC1SUP?1  (2t1ba1.  1965-1988)
Dopendent Variables  Private  Commtion  to  Private  Disposable
Income Rtto  (CpIDlp)
gq.til  C  P5  r  *c  S  PC  CC  H  Ps  074  06566  Rho  1A  DW
P  P  1)?  IP  I
I  -Static  Izpttati@ns
1.1  OtS  1.  0  0.01  0.21  -0.53  .0.30  .0.15  -4.64  -O."6  0.08  . - - 0.62  1.91
(6.4)  (0.1)  (0.4)  (-0.8)  (-0.4)  (2-.3)  (-1.3)  (-1.1)  (0.4)
1.2  M.  0.61  0.12  0.67  - - -0.06  0.06  0.72  0.50  1.61
(7.6)  (1.7)  13.3) 
(-2.0)  (2.4)  (5.0)
2.  Part.  Peif.  loretUbt
2.1  CIS  l.06  0.03  0.08  .0.39  .0.07  .0. 1  -3.9  -0.93  0.06  0.62  1.97
(X.0)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (.0.6)  (-0.1)  (-2.)  (4-.7)  (.0.8)  (0.3)
2.2  U.  0."  0.09  0.05 
-0.03  0.03  0.13  0.16
(10.)  (1.7  (0.2) 
(.0.6)  (1.8)  (0.6)
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TABLE 6.3
PRIVATE  INVESTMENT  (Zimbabwe,  1965-1988)
Dependent  Variable: Private  Investment  Ratio
to  GDP (Ip/Y)
Pi  FM  .i  70  780  15 
cEq  RL  e  C  r  STI  T  Y  VS  S
1.1  OLS  -0.09  -0.01  -0.21  0.22  *0.27  1.66  0.28  0.16  .0.1S
(-0.6)  (-0.1)  (-1.5)  (1.1)  (-1.1)  (2.')  (2.0)  (1.7)  (-0.2)
1.2  OLS  0.11  -0.13  .0.42  -0.16  0.23  - 0.47  0.33  1.07
(1.2)  (-3.7)  (-2.6)  (-1.3)  (1I.2  (3.51  (3.9)  (.5)
1.21  IIL (*A)  0.16  -0.16  .0.41  .0.21  0.25  _  0.40  0.34  1.29
(2.4)  (-6.5)  --3.3)  (-2.4)  (2.0)  (4.1)  (5.1)  (6.0)
1.3  OSS  0.09  -0.12  .0.45  -0.12  0.14  _  0.49  0.31  1.06
(1.1)  (.4.1)  (-4.3)  (-1.4)  (1.2)  (4.1)  (4.4)  (3.7)
1.3  U.  (M1)  0.14  .0.14  .0.49  .0.14  0.15  . 0.4  0.30  1.31
(2.2)  (.4.6)  (-5.7)  (-2.6)  (2.1)  (4.6)  (5.6)  (6.3)
Rzas1as  r  vPIP  nuVU.  vT  D7375  084  am0  Dv
1. I  CIA  0.18  0.66  1.60  9  0.0001  0.01  0.02  - 0.95  2.26
(1.7)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (-1.9)  (1.5)  (1.0)
1.2 O  . 0.37  1.12  . 0.02  0.0J  - 0.93  2.76
(-0.5)  (0.5)  (230)  (1.4)
1.2  U.  (ALl)  .0  .0  0.012  0.06  .0.70  0.99  2.40
(..)  (.0.4)  (41)  (2.3)  (-3.3)
1.3  OW-  0.02  0.05  *  0.94  2.74
(2.3)  (4.1)
1.31  ML (All)  0.02  0.06  .0.66  0.9$  2.32
(4.0)  5.2)  (-3-.2)-77.
7. EXTERNAL  ACCOUNTS,  REAL EXCHANGE  RATES,  AND THE FISCAL  DEFICIT
Zimbabwe's  external  accounts  and real  exchange  rates are determined  to a large  extent  by the
foreign  exchange  allocation  system.  Indeed, in deciding  on how to ailocate  foreign  exchange,  the
foreign  exchange  allocation  commission  fEst makes  a projection  of the availability  of foreign  financial
funds,  subject to the government's  goal concerning  the country's  foreign  debt position.  Then the
commission  projects  total exports  under different  assumptions  with respect to the domestic  value of
foreign  prices and supply  variables  - Uke  upcoming  harvests  of main crops.  This provides  an idea
around how much imports  the country  can afford and, thus, the basis for the foreign exchange
allocation.  The allocation  itself proceeds  then according  to sectoral  and historical  criteria.
In the last seven  or eight years, the objective  of reducing  dependence  on foreign  financing
has been central in the strictness  of the commission  in terms of providing  foreign exchange  for
imports.  In effect, as a result of this effort, the current account  deficit  as a proportion  to GDP has
declined  fiom 103% in 1982  to a small  surplus  in 1988 As mentioned  in previous  sections,  this has
been done while the fiscal  deficit  has not declined  from 10o of GDP, which  means that domestic
debt financing  has replaced  foreign  indebtness.
The government,  however,  does not only manage  the quantitative  mechanism  of centrally
allocating  foreign  eachange;  it also  controls  the exchange  rate and sets import  tariffk The exchange
rate policy  could be important when the foreign  exchange  projection is made for total exports,
sensitive  to the real exchange  rate, which  in turn can  be affected  by  the nominal  exchange  rate policy.
The setting of trade taxes,  however,  seems to have responded  in the past more to the objective  of
raising  fiscal  revenues  than to the purpose of protecting  national  production  or limiting  imports  in
generaL  In spite  of this,  custom  duties  have significantly  increased  in the last decade,  cooperating  to
the goal  of reducing  imports  in order to adjust to the diminished  availability  of foreign  exchange  and
the desire  of decreasing  foreign  indebtness.- 78 -
7.1 The Model
Tbe existence  of quantitative  restrictions  to foreign  trade, especially  to imports,  casts some
doubts  on the relevance  of the two-step  procedure  in the model  proposed  for this research  project".
In particular,  the reduced-form  equation  for the trade balance  mixes  the effects  of several  variables,
without  allowing  for a clear understanding  of the possible  effects  of the quantitative  restrictions.  Less
trouble there is, however,  with the real exchange  rate equations, in spite of the assumption  of
instantaneous  clearing  of the non-tradables  market that underlies  it. Indeed,  even though domestic
prices  have been subject  to some form of control by the government,  inflation  rates - especially  of
the price  index  for the rich -have  tended  to reflect  effectively  changes  in the monetary  and exchange
rate conditions  in the economy,  at least when one works with annual data3'.  This, coupled to a
crawling  peg exchange rate policy  (at least in the last few years) has avoided also any serious
misalignment  of relative  prices.
In estimating  the relationship  between  external  variables  like the trade balance  and the real
exchange  rate, on one side,  and fiscal  policies  on the other, we have  proceeded  following  the two-step
procedure  proposed  in Easterly  et. aL  (1989)  amended  in two  ways. First,  less  emphasis  is placed  on
the accumulation  of net foreign  assets (or debt) as a medium  to long-term  driving  force,  due to the
lack  of access  of domestic  private  agents to foreign  financial  markets. Second,  the determination  of
the trade balance  in each period is  in itself  a two-step  procedure  of the ype descnrbed  above. At the
beginning  of the year, the govermment  projects the trade balance on the basis of the difference
between income  and absorption  (which  is equivalent  to running  a regression  with the explanatory
variables  proposed  by RodrWguez  (1989)).  Simultaneously,  it projects  total exports  based  on the value
of the appropriate relative prices - the terms of trade and the real export exchange  rate.  Given
3 See  Easterly,  Rodrlguez,  and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989)  and Rodrpguez  (1989).
3'See section  5 for the behavior  of the CPI for the rich.-79  -
projected  trade balance  and export levels,  the government  instructs  the foreign  exchange  allocation
commission  to allocate  projected  available  foreign  exchange  to imports. Naturally,  projected  ex ante
and actual  ex post foreign  exchange  resources  will  differ  due to unexpected  changes  in the exogenous
variables  driving  trade balance  and export  behavior.
The government  can also affect  the actual  trade balance  through  its exchange  rate policy,  if
the real exchange  rate is affected  by the nominal  exchange  rate policy. The extent of these effects
can be tested in the empirical  work  that follows.
The described  amendments  to the original  model  result  in a set-up  comparable  to Rodrfguez'
(1989)  in one important  respect: fiscal  policies  are still  reflected  in the trade balance  and the real
exchange  rate equations. The relative  prices  of (or relevant  exchange  rates for) exports  and imports
are specified  as follows:
(7.1)  ex  (P.XIPN)  = ex(7T',t,,7S/Y,  GIY, GtJG),
ex 1, ex 3 2 0; ex 4, ex, s 0; e2? 0.
(7,2)  em E  (PhPH) = em  T*,  ti,  7h/Y, GIY. G/G),
em 2, em3 2  0;  ems, em4 em5 s  0.
The trade surplus  ratio to GDP is given  by:
(7.3)  TS/Y  = ts (ird, ODGJY,  NFAIY,  B.,1Y,  xtax)
tSS  2t 0; ts,, tS21  tS3,  tS4  S  0.
Finally  the export function  is specified  as:
(7.4)  X/Y = x (Tr, YIYP);  or  (4')  X/Y = x' (ex, Y/YP);*80-
x,, X' 1 a O;  x 2 S 0,
where the uncovered  interest rate differential  is defined as:
(7.5)  lrdO-(i(  41  +i¶t))/(1  +  (i  "  +t%. ));
and where Px is price of exports;  PM  is price  of imports,  PM  is price of non-tradeable  goods, TI is
foreign  terms of trade, IT  is domestic  terms of trade, tM  is the average  tariff rate, TS is the trade
surplus,  G is government  spending  (public  consumption  plus public  investment),  GN  is government
spending  on non-tradeable  goods,  i is  the average  domestic  interest  rate,  i' is  the foreign  interest  rate, Ae
is the expected  rate of nominal  devaluation,  OD is the operational  public  sector deficit,  B., is the
lagged-end-of-period  domestic  public  sector  stock,  Y is GDP, YP is potential  GDP, CA is the capital
account  surplus,  X is total exports,  and xtax is the inflation  tax.
The signs  below  equations  (7.1) to (7.3)  denote expected  signs  of the corresponding  partial
derivatives,  and are consistent  with Easterly  et. al. (1989)  and in Rodriguez  (1989). Also,  the effect
of the relative price of exports - either 1T or ex - on exports is clearly  positive  for a small  country
like Zimbabwe,  while the effect of the cyclical  indicator  of economic  activity  (Y/YP) should be
negative.- 81  -
TABLE  7.1
ESTIMATION  RESULTS  FOR REAL EXCHANGE  RATES
Independent  Variables
Dependent  Constant  Ln(G/Y)  Ln(GN/G)  Ln(TS/Y)(-1) Ln(TT*)  tM
Variable
Equation 7.1:
ex  -0.94  -0.52  -0.23  0.06  0.37  -0.26
(t value)  (4.13)  (-3.84)  (-1.58)  (2.15)  (1.77)  (-1.15)
R Square  0.68




em  -0.55  -0.38  -0.11  0.06  -0.6  0.15
(t value)  (-2.16)  (-2.74)  (-0.85)  (Z02)  (-2.93)  (.93)
R Square  0.61
Ad. R Square  0.53
D.W.  1.79
Rho  0.68
Note:  The deflator  for the real exchange  rate is the average  wage  index.- 82  -
TABLE 7.2
ESTIMATION  RESULTS  FOR TRADE SURPLUS  AND EXPORTS
Independent  Variables




(T value)  -4.67  .3.47  .0.65  038  -0.24  0.46
R Squiare  0.8S
Ad. R Square  0.78
D.W.  1.76
Rho
Ln(TSlY)  -3.62  -2.3  40S8  0.35  0.23  40.56
(t value)  (40.82)  (-0.44)  (-2.36)  (1.9S)  (-2.28)  (40.40)
R Square  0.83
Ad. R. Square  0.76
D.W.  1.7S
Rho
constant  Ln(ex)  Lni(r'  Ln(YNYP)
Equation 7.4
Ln (X/Y)  -1.25  0S4  - *0.43
(t value)  (-15.S5)  (3.81)  (-1.66)
R Square  0.73
Ad. R. Square  0.70
D.W.  1.78
Rho  0.87
Ln (X/Y)  -131  - 025  052
(t value)  (.17.34)  (1.29)  (1.S4)
R Square  0.59
Ad. R Square  0.55
D.W.  1.68
Rho  0.78- 83 -
7.2 Empirical  Results
Equations  (7.1)  to (7.4)  were  estimated  in log  linear  form,  with annual  data for the 1965-1988
period. Regressions  were run by using  generalized  least  squares  (GLS),  with  a maximum  likelihood
procedure to  correct for first order autocorrelation  and instrumental  variables to  correct for
simultaneity  bias.'  Results are reported in Tables  7.1 and 7.2.'
The goodness  of fit of both equations  - around  60% - is not highly  satisfactory,  although  the
results reported are the best found in this and other respects.  The lack of slow-adjustment
mechanisms  in the specification  can not be blamed  for this  because the inclusion  of lagged  ex or em
as explanatory  variables  (in non-repo.,ed  results)  did not contribute  to the estimations.
In terms of the effects  of individual  variables,  things  look better.  Both real exchange  rates
present significantly  negative  elasticities  with respect  to the share of government  spending  in GDP
contirming  the theoretical  prediction. In addition,  the proportion  of govemment  spending  devoted
to non-tradeable  activities  is also found to affect negatively  both real exchange  rates, although  we
cannot reject the hypothesis  that this effect  is not significantly  different  from zero. Foreign  terms  of
trade also  exhibit  the right  sign  in both equations,  but they  affect  more  significantly  the real imports
38The  application  of logarithms  to series  that can have  negative  values forced  the addition
of a constant to all series  in order to eliminate  those negative  values.
3 "In the estimations  of equations  7.1 and 7.2,  for the real export exchange  rate and the real
import  exchange  rate, respectively,  non-tradeable  prices  - the deflator  in the definition  of both ex
and em -were proxied  alternatively  by the average  wage  index  and the domestic  price level.
Results  were clearly  better when using  the former,  which  is what is reported in Table 7.1.  The
price of Exports  and the price  of imports  were proxied  by the corresponding  deflators  in the
national accounts.  Also,  variables  like G, GN,  TS, and Y are represented  by the corresponding
series at current prices.  GN  is the government  spending  in health,  housing,  and education  and tries
to represent  spending  in non-tradeable  goods.  The series  for foreign  terms  of trade, TI,  was
constrvcted  from the ratio between the exports  deflator  and the imports  deflator,  adjusted  by the
average  tariff  rate finplicit  in custom  duties revenues  of the central  govemment.  This implicit
avwrage  tariff rate is also present in the regression  as tb. The expected  rate of devaluation  was
assumed  to be equal to the actual rate, a perfect-foresight  approximation  of the rational
expectations  hypothesis.  The foreign  interest is Libor and the domnestic  interest rate is a weighted
average  of active  financial  rates.-84-
exchange  rate. The coefficients  accompanying  the series  reflecting  implicit  tariff  rates also  show  the
correct signs', but again  they are not significantly  different  from  zero. Finally,  the effect of the one
year lagged  trade surplus  is small  but significant,  and shows  the expected  sign." 4
Estimation  results  for equations  7.3 and  7.4 are reported in Table  7.2.  In the case  of the trade
surplus  equation,  we es.mated two  versions,  depending  on the way  ir which  the govemment  finances
its deficit.  Following  Rodrfguez  (1989),  we first tried with debt financing  by including  the variable
B. 11Y;  and later with the option of inflationary  financing  by including  the variable  xtax. The overall
adjustment  looks  slightly  better in the formtx  case,  in spite  of the fact  that the sign  of the coefficient
of B.J/Y  is  wrong.  In both cases,  the overall  fit is  reasonable  and there are no signs  of autocorrelation.
However,  we cannot rule out multicollinearity  given  the low  t-values.
In terms  of individual  variables,  all coefficients  show  the right  signs  in both equations,  except
for the case  of the public  debt to GDP ratio already  mentioned  above. The coefficient  of the interest
rate differential  is not significantly  different  from zero in both estimated  versions  of equation (7.3).
We tried  with a different  definition  of ird  based  on the actual  implicit  interest  rate paid  by Zimbabwe
for its foreign  debt, but results  did not improve  in terms of increasing  the significance  of ird.
What is most interesting  about these  estimations  of equation  (7.3) are the computed  effects
of the operational  deficit  of the public  sector,  on one side, and  of the capital  account  surplus  to GDP
ratio (denoted by CA/Y),  on the other. The latter variable  is used as a flow  proxy for net foreign
assets (NFA), in Rodrfguez  (1989) set-up, and it seems even more appropriate than NFA in
Zimbabwe's  contex, given  the way  in which  the government  decides  upon the allocation  of foreign
'In  the real export exchange  rate, the theoretical  sign  is ambiguous.
"By using  the lagged  interest of the current surplus,  possible  simultaneity  biases  are ruled out.
In this sense,  the one-year-lagged  TS/Y is an instrumental  variable.
"We also used the current account  deficit  as an explanatory  variable  alternative  to the trade
surplus,  without  success.- 85 -
exchange.  As one could expect  from a theoretical  point of view,  the effect of CA/Y on the trade
surplus  to GDP ratio is negative:  the more foreign  funds  flowing  in, the more financing  is available
for imports  without  resorting  to increased  exports.  What the estimated  elasticities  indicate  is that an
increase  in capital inflows  dntes  not bring  an equal increase  in the trade surplus,  but substantially
less'. This could  be indicating  that the government  uses to "save?  some  of those capital  inflows  in
the form of foreign  reserve  accumulation,  which  in turn coincides  with the government's  objective
of reducing  net foreign  indebtness.
In the case  of the operational  deficit  of the public  sector,  the estimations  indicate  that a 10%
increase  in this variable  will imply  a reduction in the trade surplus  of around 6%, confirming  the
theoretical  presumption  in this respect:  the rise in ODO  increases  absorption  and, thus, for the same
income  level, reduces  TS. However,  the mechanism  for financing  this deficit  does not apparently
influence  the trade surplus  to GDP ratio to any significant  extent. Indeed, neither the outstanding
stock  of public  sector  debt nor the inflation  tax  seem to be statistically  significant.  The reason  is  clear.
Most of the public  sector deficit  has been financed  in the last  eight years  by issuing  domestic  public
debt, which  is either compulsory  - like the share held by institutio.  nvestors  - or is voluntary  but
attractive  to private  savers  due to the lack  of alternative  portfolio  choices.  In addition,  private  savings
have  significantly  increased  as  consumption  of foreign  goods  is  strictly  limited.  Simultaneously,  private
investors  have  not been much  crowded  out by this public  indebtness  process  because  the acquisition
of foreign  capital  goods has also been cut by the foreign  exchange  allocation  system.  So, in the end,
it is not strange that the increaie in public  sector bonds has not been reflected  by a lower  trade
surplus.  They  are, temporarily  at least,  disconnected  to each other.
'Since we are considering  percentage  rates of change,  there could  be some  differences
between a 1% of CAJY  and a 1% of TSNY.  But on average  these differences  should  not be large.e86-
The low  significance  of the inflation  tax  is not surprising  either, due to the same  reason. The
public  sector has resorted to debt issuance  for financing  its deficits,  while the Reserve Bank  of
Zimbabwe  has been quite conservative  in limiting  monetary  financing  of the deficit.  This has paid  off
so far in terms  of a moderate  inflation  rate, unthinkable  in most other countries  with public  sector
deficits  of the magnitude  of Zimbabwe's.
Exports  were also specified  according  to two different  versions.  One is more in agreement
with the spirit  of Rodriguez'  (1989)  model  by inserting  the domestic  terms of trade as the relevant
relative  price variable,  while  the other specifies  the real export exchange  rate in such a role. Both
versions  include the ratio of current to potential  GDP as an additional  explanatory  variable. The
reasoning  is that the higher this ratio, the lower  is the share of exportable  goods produced  that
effectively  ends up in foreign  markets. Both the sign  of this  variable  and the sign  of either measure
of relative  prices are correct, although  in the case of Y/YP  in neither case it achieves  signiticancy
levels  high enough to reject the null hypothesis.
Overall fit of the version  with the real export exchange  rate as the L.aevant  relative  price
variable  is reasonable,  while  in the other case it is rather low.  We feel comfortable  with the former,
since  the eventual feed-back  of the export-GDP  ratio to the real exchange  rate is diffused  through
the trade surplus  effect  on ex.  Furthermore,  in such equation  the estimation  indicates  that the one-
year lagged trade surplus  is the sigr;ficant  variable  rather than its contemporaneous  value.
The reported empirical  results tend to confirm  the relevance  of public  sector deficits  and
public  sector spending  on the external  sector of Zimbabwe's  economy.  But this relevance  pertains
more to  the  levels of  these variables than to  deficit financing.  The particular way in which
Zimbabwe's  government  administrates  imports  through  the foreign  exchange  allocation  commission
and the binding  restraints  placed  on capital  movements  are the central pieces  of this scenario.-87-
As an example,  let's do the following  exercise  based  on the above  reported empirical  results.
Let's take a 2% increase  in the government  spending  to GDP ratio.  This,  supposedly,  leads  to an 8%
increment  in ODJIY  and to an equal 2% increase  in GN,  such that GNWG  remains  unchanged.  The
increase  in G/Y would  imply  a reduction  of 1% in ex and 0.8% in em, ceteris  paribus.  It does not
matter how  this increase  in G is financed.  These numbers  would  be taken by the government  in its
projections.  Simultaneously,  the 8% increase  in ODa  would  bring  a reduction  in the trade surplus  to
GDP ratio  of about  4.8%,  which  in turn would  not affect  immediately  neither real  exchange  rate.  The
projected  reduction  in ex would.  in turn, provoke  a reduction  in the exports  to GDP ratio of about
0.5%. With all these numbers, the government  would instruct the  foreign exchange allocation
commission  to limit  imports  such that they,  as a percentage  of GDP, decline  by around 5% ',  if the
goal  is to avoid  a deterioration  of the trade surplus.
"The exact  magnitude  would  depend on the relative  weights  of imports  and exports  in the
trade surplus.- 88 -
8.  PROSPECIS  OF GROWTH'
This section attempts to underline Zimbabwe's  growth prospects in connection with the
previous  discussion  on the macroeconomic  effects  of public  sector deficits.
As a first  step, the construction  of a potential  output series  is undertaken  in order to get an
idea on how the evolution  of total investment  and changes  in the incentive  system  have affected
potential  growth in the past and how it will affect future growth prospects. As a second step a
behavioral function for the ratio of actual to potential GDP is specified  in  accordance  to  a
neoclassical  output supply  function,  dependent  on relative  prices  of factor and intermediate  goods
prices.
Fimally,  a discussion  on the effects of public  sector deficits and distortions to the price
incentive  system  follows,  emphasizing  the overall  performance  of the Zimbabwean  economy  and its
prospects  of future growth.
8.1 Potential Output and Growth
The usual  way  to determine  potential  output amounts  to using  a 'sensible relation  between
this concept,  the capital stock and full.capacity  levels  of variable  factors  and interemediate  goods.
Unfortunately,  all these time series are inexistent  for Zimbabwe  and thus, have to be derived by
making  some simplilfing  assumptions,  that should take into account the major structural changes
which  have affected  the Zimbabwean  economy  since  the early 1970L
A first simplifying  assumption  is to relate potential  capital only to the fixed-zapital  stock,
excluding  full-capacity  lewls of variable  factors  and inputs. This assumption  seems to be relatively
innocuous  for a  period dominated by an excess siupply  of labor, with fixed capital being the
45his section draws  significantly  from Elbadawi  and Schmidt-HIebbel  (1991a).-89-
constraining  factor. Second,  combine  the following  steady-state  aggregate  capital  and output growth
assumption  (listed  below  for shorter time intervals):
(8.1)  DK/K  =  Dy/y
with the following  capital  accumulation  function  (valid  for any  period):
(8.2)  DK  =  fl-6K
to obtain a capital/output  ratio for a representative  base year.
(8.3)  -c)
y
where y is constant-price  GDP, K is the constant-price  aggregate  domestic  capital stock, ri is
aggregate  gross  fixed  investment,  and 6 is the capital  depreciation  rate.
To derive the capital-output  ratio from (83)  for a representative, normar year, recent
medium-term  (1985-1988)  average  gross  iimestment  and  GDP growth  rates  were  combined  with  three
alternative  depreciation  rates, yielding  the following  Kly  ratios:
1  = 0.035  62  = 0.045  63 = 0.055
14 z  0.1795
2.6141  22818  2.0244
Dy/y  =  0.0337.90-
1985,  both a "normal'  and recent year,  was chosen  as the base year for deriving  the capital
series  making  use of equation  (8.2),  assuming  in addition  the intermediate  depreciation  rate 6p The
corresponding  output/capital  evolution  during 1965-1988  is shown  in figure  &1.
Three distinct  periods  characterize  the output/capital  and growth  paths of Zimbabwe  during
the last 25 years. The first one, culminating  in 1972,  is characterized  by high  growth  and stable  y/K
ratios. The 1973-1979  pre-independence  period of oil shocks  and growing  internal conflict  shows  a
protracted  recession  and imploding  output/capital  ratios. Finally,  a partial,  hesitant recovery  starts
in 1980  up to the present.
A major  problem  is how  to interpret the 1981-1988  y/K  ratio. Does it reflect lower  efficiency
in the use of capital  (as compared  tu the 1960s)  or lower  capacity  utilization,  or both?
In the absence  of reliable  data on capacity  utilization  and labor unemployment,  we opted for
assuming  that it is due to both reasons. This  implies  that the potential  output/capital  ratio during  the
1980's  is a weighted  average  of the actual output/capital  ratio of the 1960s  and the 1980s. Lacking
information,  we assumed  (arbitrary)  weights  of 0.5,  which  allow  to draw the potential  output/capital
(yp/K)  ratio in figure  8.l4t. Hence,  starting  in 1981,  and continuing  into the future, we postulate  the
following  relation  between potential  output and capital:
(8.4)  yp  =  05174K.,
The corresponding  actual to potentiLl  output ratio for 1965-88  is depicted  in figure  8.2.
Next a neoclassical  output supply  is specified  for GDP obtained  by substituting  conditional  factor
demands  into a production  function  depending  on capital,  variable  factors  (labor  and  working  capital),
'In  addition,  it is assumed  that actual  output reaches  its potential  level in 1969  and that the
1972-1981  efficiency  decline  is reflected  by a linearly  increasing  potential  output/capital  ratio
during  that period.-91  -
and intermediate  imports. By substituting  capital  by potential  output, GDP supply  can be defined
as the deviation  between actual and potential output, depending  on the real wage adjusted for
productivity  gains,  the real exchange  rate relevant  for intermediate  imports,  the real  interest rate, and
the period-specific  dummies  for Zimbabwe's  contlictive  pre-independence  period:
(8.5)  In (-Y)  = y  + I  [a  In  P  + (l-a)  In  p-  I  +
yp  We-0PW
+J~  (rp  - 0.05)  +  E  p
s
whe:e P is the GDP deflator,  W is the nominal  unit wage,  P...  is the price  of intermediate  imports,
t  is time, D. are supply-specific  dummies,  and rp is the real interest rate relevant for production
decisions,  defined  as:
(8.6)  r 1 =  I
where  'L iS  the nominal  lending  interest rate and  '  is expected  (GDP deflator)  inflation.
The real wage  in (8.5) is adjusted  for Harrod-neutral  productivity  increases  at an annual  rate
of p  =  0.008  The latter is the  1965-1972  trend growth rate in  real wages, assessed to  be
representative  for a normal period of productivity-related  wage increases  when the economy  was
operating  at levels  close  to full  employment  (see figure  82).  From  1972  to 1979  real  wages  stagnated
and after 1979 they grew strongly,  probably  reflecting  both the partial output recovery  and the-92-
political  regime  change. Figure  8.3  shows  the evolution  of actual  and productivity-adjusted  real  wages
during  1965-1988,  taking  1980  as the base year.
A final  feature of relative  output supply  equation (8.5)  is that it is homogeneous  of degree
zero  in absolute  prices  - a desirable  property  to avoid  real  effects  stemming  from changes  in absolute
prices.
The output supply  function  for the actual  to potential  output ratio in eq. (8.5)  was estimated
by different  estimation  techniques. Results  are shown  in Tables  8.1,  8.2,  and  83. No evidence  exists
for the presence  of a "Cavallo  effect";  the non-significance  of the real interest rate made us drop this
variable  from the following  runs.
The results are  reported in  table 8.1.  Line I  shows the estimate for the complete
specification,  with  a positive  but not significant  coefficient  for the "Carallo  effect' represented  by the
real interest rate.  Hence this variable  is dropped from the following  estimations.
Line 2 presents  two-stage  least  square  results  to take care of possible  simultaneity  biases  due
to  the non-independence  of the  real wage and the real price of imports stemming from the
interaction  of aggregate  supply  and demand. The results do not differ much from the US run
reported in line 3, both in terms  of the excelient  overall  fit and the individual  coefficients.
The prie-elasticity of  aggregate  supply  is relatively  low  - 0.44  in the NLISLS equation.
It implies  that aggregate  demand  shocks  (for a given  aggregate  demand  elasticity)  will have  a strong
relative  price response  and a weak  output effect.
The coefficient  a (which  is related  to the share  of labor in gross  output net of capital  value
added)  is  very high  and significant,  reflecting  a strong  s.eight of the real product  wage  in comparison
to the real exchange  rate in determining  short-run  output.TABLE  8.1
ESTIMATION  RBSULTS  FOR THE REIATIVE OUTPUT  SUPPLY  (1966-1988)
In (2)  - T  *+  2 (a  InX-r  + (1-a)  In  - 1 P+  (r,  - 0.05) + E2  b,D
Equati  y  A  a  B  62  DW
1. Non-linear  IS  -0.10  0.45  0.92  0.19  -0.13  -0.25  0.92  2.26
(4.7)  (4.7)  (6.7)  (1.2)  (-58)  (-9.2)
2.  Non-Ulinear  SLS  -a11  0.44  0.85  - 0.12  -0.25  0.91  2.12
(-2.9)  (2.6)  (3.1)  (-3.7)  (-5.6)
3.  Non-linear  LS  411  0.40  0.80  -0.12  -0.24  0.91  2.12
(-5.9)  4.6  (0.14)  (-S.9)  (-93)
Note:  The first  dummy  is 1.0 for 1974,  1975,  1976,  1980,  1984  (0 othenrise) and the second  dummy,  for the stronger  recessionary  years,  is I
for 1977,  1978  and 1979  (0 otherwise). Mme  two-stage  least  squares  estination in line  2 uses  the following  list of instruments:  the constant,
lagged  values  of the lgarithms of the productivity-adjusted  real wage,  the real price  of intermediate  imports  and the dependent  variable,  in
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Finally,  Al  and 62  reflect  the relative  intensity  of the supply  disruptions  during  the 1974-1975-
1976-198601984  and 1977-1978-1979  periods,  which  coincide  mostly  with  the pre-independence  period
of foreign  oil shocks  and domestic  civil  war.
8.2 Public  Sector Deficits.  Distortions  and Growth
As mentioned  in previous  sections,  Zimbabwe's  economic  position in the late 1980s  was
fragile. A stagnating  economy  showing  low  rates of growth  and employment  were the symptoms  of
deeper problems  affecting  the prospects  of sustained  growth  in the medium  and long term. The key
problems  were inadequate  investment  levels,  the budget  deficit,  weak  export  performance  and a poor
domestic  incentive  environment  for the process  of economic  restructuring.  How do these problems
reflect  in the empirical  results  shown  above?
Figure  8.1 illustrates  a sharp contraction  in economic  activity  starting  in the early 1970s,  'a
the oil shocks  and the tumultuous  domestic  political  situation  hit the economy. With independen:  e
achieved,  in 1980,  a hesitant  recovery  started,  initially  financed  by external  indebtness.  When foreign
capital  inflows  fell after 1982  a major successful  reduction  in current account  deficits  was achieved
between  1982  and 1986.  Growth  remained  sluggish  after  an initial  significant  ir^rease in public  sector
spending. The large public  spending  program,  in turn, was financed  to a large extent by domestic
debt, that is, with transfers from Zimbabwe's  private sector. As discussed  in section 6, both an
increase  of private saving  and a decline  in private investment  were behind  the rise in the private
surplus  necessary  for huge public  sector deficits  that hovered  around 10-149b  of GDP. The decline
in private  investment  was not accompanied  by similar  increases  in public  physical  investment,  so that
total fixed-capital  investment  has been decreasing  as a percentage  of GDP. It is in this sense that
public  sector deficit  financing  has been detrimental  to Zimbabwe's  growth  prospects,  as indicated  by-98 -
only  slightly  increasing  potential  output in the last seven  years  (see Figure  8.2),  at an annual  average
rate of 2.3%.
The objective  of the govemment's  expenditure  program  was to improve  the living  conditions
of the population  through  a number  of social  programs,  especially  in education  and support  of small
farmers. It is likely  that the share  of this incremental  spending  that goes to human  capital  formation
will have  positive  growth  results some  time into the future.
On the other hand,  private  investment  has not only  been  discouraged  by higher interest  rates
created by high public  sector defirits, but also by two other reasons. The first one also concerns
deficit  financing,  although  indirectly  so. Indeed,  the main  instrument  used  by the economic  authority
to effect the reduction in current account deficits  was to enact a very strict foreign exchange
allocation mechanism  that acts primarily  on  private sector imports, both of consumption  and
investment  goods.  This mechanism  has been so severe that there has been no way for domestic
production  to substitute  for the decrease  in imports. In the end, this has been an effective  constraint
on aggregate  private investment  demand.
The other factor affecting  private  investment  has been an overali  environment  not friendly
enough  to private  business,  which  reflects  in  scarce  financial  resources  available  for private  investment
projects  in a regulated  financ,al  system,  a number  of regulations  to private operations,  and a heavy
tax  burden.
These last elements do not only affect the level of total investment,  but also its overall
productivity.  Indeed, distortions of different sorts, but in particular the strict foreign exchange
allocation  system,  generate a relative  price  structure  not really  reflecting  the relative  scarcity  of goods
and factors. Hence the same  investment  flows  to the wrong  sectors  yielding  low  returns reflected  by
both the stagnation  of the potential  output to capital  ratio (see figure  8.1)  and the low  rate of labor
productivity  gains  (see figure  8.3)..99-
The influence  of the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism  is not apparent  in the estimation
of equation  (8.5).  Indeed,  the coefficient  showing  the sensitivity  of the actual  to potential  GDP ratio
with respect to the real exchange rate is low. However,  since the mechanism  alluded to is of a
quantitative  nature, this is not a surprising  result. On the contrary,  it tends to reflect the fact  that
the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism  has virtually  closed  the economy  to international  trade
(particularly  on the side  of imports)  and, thus,  the importance  of the real exchange  rate in aggregate
supply  decisions  has diminished  vis-a-vis  the real wage.
Concluding  Remarks
Te  1980s  witnessed  a recovery  of the output/capital  ratio  after the sharp  deterioration  of this
ratio in the tumultuous  1970s.  However,  this recovery  was  only  partial and  potential  output in the last
five years has shown  only a modest  increase  at best. This has been the result of a combination  of
factors  that will  also  impinge  on future  growth  unless  some  reforms  are undertaken.  Foremost  among
these factors are the huge public sector deficit fmanced  by the transfer of resources from the
domestic  private  sector,  and  the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechan-ism  that,  while  being  instrumental
in the financing  of the public  sector  deficit  by constrained  private  sector  spending,  has also  precluded
private  investment  from being the engine  of growth.  Therefore,  reforms  to the public  sector aimed
to reduce the large deficit and a simultaneous  dismantling  of  the foreign exchange allocation
mechanism  would  improve  Zimbabwe's  long  run growth  prospects..100-
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the various macroeconomic  effects of public sector deficits in
Zimbabwe  within the  framework  specified  by Easterly,  Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989).
Because of the coexistence  of significant  and persistent high public  sector deficits  and moderate
inflation  rates, the Zimbabwean  case is most interesting. Section  2 hax  brought  together flow  and
stock  information  on non-financial  and financial  public  sub sectors  to draw  a comprehensive  picture
of the consolidated  public  sector deficit,  its financing,  and public  asset and liability  holdings. ITis
picture shows  the foDlowing:
(i)  After 1980/81  consolidated  non-financial  public  sector deficits  grew from less  than 10% of
GDP to 13-14%,  maintained  over a 6-year  span. In 1987/88  a significant,  although  still  partial
fiscal  adjustment  took place,  lowering  the deficit  by 3.5 percentage  points and 0.9 additional
percentage points during 1988/89. This adjustment  reflected mostly  an improvement  in
central government  current expenditure,  in particular,  a cut in non-interest transfers  and
subsidies.
(ii)  Nominal  interest rates paid  on NFPS  domestic  debt have increased  continuously  during  the
1980s  (from 4.4%  in 1980/81  to 13.5%  in 1988/89)  while  the stock  of foreign  debt roe  from
12%  to 38% of GDP during the same  period. Both factors  explain  why  NFPS net interest
payments  increased from 2.4% of GDP to 7.8% between 1980/81  and 1988/89. As both
interest rates and debt stocks are unlikely  to decrease significantly  in the  near future,
subsequent fiscal adjustments  will require correcting  the size and possibly  the sign of the
consolidated  non-financial  primary  deficit,  which  stands  at 2.2% of GDP in 1988/89.101-
Section  3 of the paper identified  the main  macroeconomic  and policy  variables  affecting  the
above-the-line NFPS deficit during the  eighties.  More illuminating  than  the  year-by-year
decomposition  of the deficit  is to assess  its structural  srnsitivity  with respect  to its main  determinants.
Our analysis  shows  the following:
(iii)  The early financing  requirements  of high pubkic  deficits  have contributed to a steady  and
massive  accumulation  of public  liabilities,  from 54.1%  in June 1980  to 86.4%  in June 1987.
While monetary base stayed relatively  constant at low levels throughout the period, the
composition  and magnitude  of public  debt changed  dramatically.  Total public  sector foreign
debt increased from 7.4% of GDP in 1980 to  41.9% in  1985,  to  start a slight decline
thereafter.  Domestic  public  debt first slowed  down  during the early 1980s,  but started to
increase  significantly  thereafter, from  25% in 1983  to 38% in 1988. An encouraging  sign is
that the 1987/88  fiscal  adjustment  allowed  total public  sector labilities  and total public  debt
to decline  for the first time in the 19&)  This reflects  the fact that the 1987/88  adjustment
brought  the deficit  uloser  to levels  which  avoid  increasing  the public  Uabilities  to GDP ratios
if macroeconomic  conditions  are as favorable  as during  the last two  years.
(iv)  Among macroeconomic  variables,  and in decreasing  order, real GDP growth, real import
growth,  and a real exchange  devaluation  have  a negative  impact  on the public  sector deficit.
On the contrary,  and also in decreasing  order, increases  in the domestic  real interest rate,
domestic  inflation,  and foreign  nominal  interest rate tend to boost the deficit.
(v)  Among  central  government  policy  variables,  and reflecting  directly  their  size,  percentage  cuts
in the wage bill,  transfers/subsidies,  public  investment,  and expenditure  on other goods  and
services  impact in decreasing  magnitude  on the deficit.  Further policy  measures  on the
revenue side, such as tax reforms  and reductions  in the public  euterprisw.  deficit,  can have
major  and immediate  effects  on public  finances,  while  reductions  in domestic  and foreign  debt-102 -
stocks  and hence interest payments  come only slowly  as a result of lower  past deficits  and
indebtment.
Section  4  was  devoted  to obtain  bounds  for sustainable  public  deficits,  calculated  from  relating
the  above-the-line  primary deficit and interest payments to  below-the-line  financing through
monetization  or floating  of domestic  or foreign  debt. Sustainability  was used  in the sense of holding
June 1988  total public  sector liability  to GDP ratios constant. The main conclusions  are:
(vi)  Under a base scenario  showing  a macroeconomic  environment  similar  to that of the recent
past, the sustainable  primary  deficit  is estimated  at 1.7%  of GDP, increasing  to 2.9% under
a more favorable  scenario of higher growth and lower real domestic  interest rates.  The
corresponding  nominal  (primary  plus interest payments)  deficits  are 9.9% and 10.7%,  which
are comparable  to the 10-11%  actual nominal  deficit  range of 1987/88  and 1988/89.
(vii)  However,  under an unfavorable  scenario  of lower  growth,  higher reai domestic  and foreign
interest rates, and a real exchange  rate depreciation  of 7% per year, the sustainable  deficit
has to reverse its sign: a  4.2% primary  surplus  (or a 5.6% nominal  deficit) is required to
avoid  exploding  public  sector liabilities.  Hence, current public  sector deficits  in Zimbabwe
seem  to be unsustainable  under  negative  macroeconomic  developments  and/or required  real
exchange  rate depreciations  to support  structural  changes  such as a trade reform.
In Section  5, we found that:
(viii)  The govemment  has taken advantage  of the many regulations  of the financial  markets in
order to recycle  the private  sector surplus. This has allowed  the public  sector to  finance  its
huge deficits  starting  in 1983,  when foreign  financing  became  less available,  while  domestic
inflation  has been kept  moderate.  However,  our simulations  tend  to indicate  that this  situation- 103  -
is  not sustainable  and that a greater  inflation  will  result  sooner  or later,  following  Sargent  and
Wallace  (1hAi)  "unpleasant  monetarist"  dict-m.
(ix)  In spite of financial  sector regulation  and the significant  amount  of resources  that the private
sector is saving  in net terms, the moderate  but increasing  trend of real interest rates in the
last decade is hown so  be a result of the increasing  public  debt that has resulted  from both
the magnitude  and the financing  of the public  sector deficits.
Section  6 poses the following  question: how  have  hi,'  public  sector deficits  affected  private
saving  and investment?!  Zimbabwe's  recent experience  suggests  the following:
(x)  Between 1981/82  and 1987/88  the country achieved  a major improvement  in its external
accounts,  turning  a 9.A%  current  account  deficit  into a balanced  account. This improvement
relied  exclusively  on the private  sector, as the public  sector deficit  hovered around 10-14%
of GDP. Both an increase  in private  saving  and a decline  in private investment  were behind
the rise in the private surplus.  Since 1984/85  private saving  exceeds  20% of GDE and
finances  more than 100%  of the economy's  domestic  investment.  Low private  consumption
was made possible  from combining  consumer  import  repression  and strict controls  on capital
outflows  with a perception  of stability  of the financial  system.
(xi)  Declining  private investment  until 1986/87  implied  lower aggregate  capital formation  and,
probably,  lower  efficiency  of domestic  investment,  contributing  to Zimbabwe's  modest  growth
record after 1981. The effect of the 1987/89  fiscal  adjustment  on private investment  is
eacouraging,  as it allowed a  recovery  of 2.4 percentage points of  the gross domestic
investment  rate.
(xii)  Our results indicate that real interest rates have a strong negative influence  on private
investment  -hence domestic  debt financing  of public  sector deficits,  which  tends to push up-104-
interest rates as has been observed  during the 1980s,  has a significant  crowding  o.  ffect.
This is  partly compensated by crowding-in  of  private investment from higher public
investment
Section  7 points  out:
(xiii)  The empirical  results  confirm  the impact  of public  sector  deficits  and public  sector spending
on the trade surplus, and the relative export and import prices in Zimbabwe. But this
relevance  pertains more to the levels  of these variables  than to how deficits  are financed.
The particular way in which Zimbabwe's  government  admirnistrates  imports through the
foreign exchange allocation commission  and the  binding restraints placed on  capital
movements  are the central  pieces  for this  outcome.
Fmally,  Section  8 deals  with the growth  prospects  of Zimbabwe's  economy:
(xiv)  The early 1980s  witnessed  a recovery  of the output/capital  ratio after the sharp deterioration
of this ratio in the tumultuous  1970s However,  this recovery  was only partial and potential
output in the last five years has shown only modest  increases  at best.  Overall  and labor
productvity  gains  have been vety low throughout  the 1980L Ibis has been the result of a
combination  of bctors that will also impinge  on future growth unless some reforms are
undertaken.  Foremost  among  these factors  are the huge public  sector deficit  financed  by the
transfer  of resources  from the domestic  private  sector, and the foreign  exchange  allocation
mechanism  that, while being instrumental  in the financing  of the public sector deficit by
constrained  prvate sector spending,  has also precluded  private inmstment from being the
engine  of growth. Therefore,  public  sector reforms  aimed  at reducing  the large deficit  and- 105-
a simultaneous  dismantling  of the foreign  exchange  allocation  mechanism  will  point to better
prospects  of growth  [  'he long run.
The major con,.usion of this study is that more rial  adjustment is required for both
macroeconomiclfinancial  stability  and growth  reasons. On one side lower  public  deficits  are required
to assure  that sustainable  public  debt paths  are maintained  even under more  adverse  macroeconomic
circumstances  than the current  ones. On the other side,  high deficits  have  crowded  out both private
consumption  and private investment. Low private investment  rates throughout the  1980s  have
affected  adversely  the quatity  - and probably  the quality  -of aggregate  capital  formation  and hence
the country's  growth  prospects.  Therefore  additional  public  sector adjustment,  deepening  the process
which  already has taken place, would  contribute significan^.y  to Zimbabwe's  stability  and growth
outlookL-106-
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DECOPOSITION  OF  TRE  CHANGE  IN  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR  DEFICIT:
APPLICATION  TO  Z  hABWE
Thls  appendix  presents  an  application  to  Zimbabwe  of  the  methodology  of
decomposition  of  public  sector  deficits  according  to  their  main  economic  and
policy  determinants,  based  on  Marshall  and  Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989).  Section  B.1
introduces  the notation,  section  B.2 decomposes  the tax revenue  functions
according  to  the  structure  estimated  for  Zimbabwe  in  section  3.1  and  section  B.3
decomposes  the  consolidated  non-financial  public  sector  (NFPS)  deficit  equatic.
B.1 Notation
CPSD  Consolidated  Non-Financial  Public  Sector  Deficit
P  GDP  deflator
Real GDP
Central  Government  Wage  Bill
GS  Central  Government  Current  Expenditure  on (Other)  Goods  and
Services
TS  Central  Government  Expenditure  on  (Other)  Transfers  and  Subsidies
DT  Direct  Tax  Revenue
IT  Indirect  Tax  tavenue
CD  Customs  Duties  Reven4e
PD  Parastatals  and  Local  Authorities  and  Primary  (Gross)  Deficit
E  Nominal  Exchange  Rate  (Z$lUS$)
RER  Real  Exchange  Rate
3*  Foreign  'Debt  (in  US$)
D  Domestic  Debt
iv  Nominal  Foreign  Interest  Rate
i  Nominal  Domestic  Interest  Rate
s  Dc.aestic  Inflation  Rate
r  Domestic  Real  Interest  Rate
r*  US Consumer  Price  Index
RES  Residual
dt  real  direct  tax  revenue
it  real  indirect  tax  revenue
cd  real  customs  duties  revenue
E*P*
The  RER is  defined  ass  RERt  p  . Domestic  inflation  is
defined  a  st  - (Pt Pt-)/Pt-,  . All prices are  defined  as  average-
period  prices.  Domestic  and  foreign  debt  stocks  are  defined  as end-of-preceding
period  stocks. This  introduces  slight  valuation  problem for  the  dating  of
domestic  and  real  currency  values  of  both  debt  stocks. However,  this  dating-2-
inconsistency  has  no significant  effects  on the  decomposition  performed  below.'
Intereet  rates  are contemporaneous  period-average  rates,  obtained
as  ratios  between  contemporaneous  interest  payments  and  preceding  end-of-period
debt  stocks.
B.2  Tax  Revenue  Funct 4gon
Tax  revenud  functions  in levels  and  changes  are  introduced  here  for
direct  taxes,  indirect  taxes,  and  customs  duties. The  corresponding  estimation
results  are  presented  in section  3.1.
Direct  Taxes
DTt
(1) p_t  *  dttm  co +  l  Yt +  02  t +  3  RERt + 4 DTR70t  +
+  5  cwt +  06  DTR88
dtt  dti  g-)  a(d  RER  A-  i 
()  (-)  _ (2  dt  t_ I  (dt)  +03  dt  t  RERt  +
+04^  (d DTR70t)  +  aS  (d  CWt)  + +4  t-1-,ta  t-1




(2)  I  itt  a  + 61  Yt + A 2RERt  +  a3ITR70t+  a  ITR81t
t
ite  iee  r  RERt  I  1
(21)  A(  y  I  2 it  RER  +  3  3it  (dTR0t)
t  t-I  ~~t-1  t  t-1
+2  1.  (dI'TR81  )  +  -I  4  itt  t+(B 1it  1)y  j +  resit  t
t-1  t-1
'For  a  major  discussion  of this  issue  and  a  solution  involving  a  distinction
between  average  and  end-of-period  deflators,  applied  to  Zimbabwe,  see  Rhadr  and
Schmidt-Hebbel  (1989  a,  b).-3-
Customc  Dutloa
CDt
(3)  - a  adt 'o  70  71  'MPt+  72CDR82t+  73CDR83  + 7  CDR88t
ct  yt-I  [ 1 dt1  AIt  2  =d  (d  CDR82t)  +
resed  +73  d  (d  CDR83t)  +  v4 a  (d  CDR8St)  - ;t  ]+
t  ~~~t-1  ct-1
where the residuals  are  due both  to  estimation  errors (the  ai,  fil
Pnd X  are  estimated coefficient:)  and  the  omission  of  the  cross-
derivative  terms.
3.3. Deflcit  Decomiogation
The decomposition  of  the  consolidated  NFPS deficit  is  performed
according  to the 10  main above-the-line  budgeting  variablea  (the  "included*
variables  in  table  15)  while  the  remaining  variables  ("excluded"  variables  in
table  15)  are  captured  by  the  residual  RES. Hence  the  change  in  the  deficit  to
CDP  ratio  is  given  by  the  following  expressions
(4)  A  (  )  _  A  (Bt  )  +  A (  )  +  A (T  - )
DTt  ITt  CD  PD
A  )  _  A (  )  - A (m  t  A  Ct-  +
Ett  tt-1  tDt-1  it_ +  ,1,  te_)  +  A  (ittl  +  A  m  +  RES
Substitute  the  tax  rovenue  functions  (1')  - (3')  into  (4)  use  the  Fisher
equ&tion  for  domestic  interest  ratoe,  and  perform  simple  variable
transformations  on  (4)  to  obtaini
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hee+{  ~)  y  )  +  RES"
where  RES' is  the  new  residual due  to the  exclusion  of other  explanatory
variables  (RES),  the  omission  of cross-derivative  terms, and  the regression
errors  of the  tax  revenue  functions.
Rearrange  equation  (5)  to obtain  the deficit  change  decomposition
as  a  function of  macroeconomic  changes  Cy,  imp,  dr,  dn,  RER, and  di ),
changes in  debt  stocks  (Dt  i/Pt  and  Dt_i/Pt)  and policy  variable  changes
('WBt/Pt,  GStPt,  TSt/Pt,  d  DTR70t  ,  d DTR88t  *  d  ITR70t  ,  d  ITRESt  I
d  CDR82t,  d  CDR83t,  d CDR88t,PDt/Pt  and  It/pt).
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